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Abstract
This dissertation consists of two independent chapters on pricing and consumer demand
in the retail sector. In chapter 1 develop an empirical model of Consumer Supermarket
Choice that enables identification of heterogeneous consumer travel costs and is suitable
for a wide range of policy experiments and the study of local competition. Chapter 2
is a theoretical investigation on pricing patterns in multi-product retail markets, when
boundedly rational consumers’ choice of a store is based on the price and valuation of a
subset of goods.
Estimation of demand systems in spatially differentiated retail markets is fundamental
for understanding local competition and the impact of policy changes. It is also challenging,
because shopping decisions consist of multiple dimensions: when to shop, where to shop and
what to buy. In chapter 1 I develop an empirically tractable model of store choice in the
supermarket industry and provide a way to identify consumers’ heterogeneous travel costs
without imposing restrictions on bundle choice. Using micro level data on a small market in
New England, I estimate demand for stores using both a moment inequality approach and
standard discrete choice techniques. I specify utility as a function of both store and bundle
characteristics, and control for the endogeneity of expenditure on the bundle. I use the
estimates of the discrete choice model to evaluate the welfare impact of 1) the closing of each
individual store in the market and 2) the relocation of one of the stores. I find that travel
costs are heterogeneous and marginally decreasing; that people like to shop at stores that are
close, but also like to shop at multiple stores. Furthermore, people value stores differently
(across consumers and shopping occasion) and trade off additional travel time for better
store characteristics; utility differentials in preference for stores correspond to a distance
ranging between zero and up to 3.3 miles. Variation in demand and substitution patterns
across stores are explained by differences in store characteristics and by the shopping habits
and geographic distribution of heterogenous consumers. Changes in market structure, like
store entry and exit can have significant impact on consumer welfare. For example, removal
on one of the stores results in a loss in CS that ranges between 8% and 44%.
The assumption of rationality in retail shopping decisions appears very problematic
when stores sell thousands of products and frequently vary their assortments and prices.
Consumers are typically uncertain about prices at different stores and for a consumer to
consider the entire distribution of bundles and prices might be a far too complex decision
process. Furthermore, models with rational consumers are incapable of fully explaining
important features of retail markets such as price dispersion, advertising and leader pric-
ing. In chapter 2 I attempt to characterize optimal pricing by multi-product retailers when
imperfectly informed consumers buy more than one product. The distinctive feature of the
model is that there are two relevant moments to all purchase decisions. First, the choice of
a store to visit, and second, the choice of the items to purchase. While consumers might
rationally choose a store to best meet their specific needs and desires, the choice of the
items to purchase is made only once in a store. Whether guided by impulse, contingent
and unforeseen needs or in-store learning about a product, consumers often end up buying
additional products which can generate higher profits for the stores. To examine the impli-
cations on retail pricing of this kind of behavior, I depart from a standard rational setup
and introduce the concept of attractor goods. Using an an approach similar to that found
in Osborne and Rubinstein (1998) and Spiegler (2006) I consider boundedly rational con-
sumers whose choice between stores is based solely and entirely on the price and valuation
of a subset of goods, the attractors. I show that retailer’s pricing decisions have to take into
account not only the direct effect of prices on a product’s demand but also the effect on
the demand for the other products sold in the store. The optimal pricing schedule will be
a decreasing function of the goods’ attractiveness, and pricing below marginal cost might
be optimal for some goods. The model provides a rationale for the strategy of loss leader
pricing and offers an intuitive explanation to countercyclical markups.
To my wife Anna, whose love and support have guided me throughout this work,
and to our daughters, Adelaide and Carolina, for the joy they brought into our lives.
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Chapter 1
Store Choice in Spatially
Differentiated Markets
1.1 Introduction
Retail markets are a major part of the US economy, with total sales of $3.8 trillion
and over 14 million people employed in 2010. At the final stage of the distribution
channel, these markets provide consumers access to a large number of final prod-
ucts. The spatial dimension of the industry makes stores inherently differentiated,
and consumers choose stores based both on the price of available products and travel
costs. Estimation of demand systems in these markets needs to account for the multi-
dimensional nature of consumers’ choice in order to accurately predict substitution
patterns and price elasticities. These, in turn, are fundamental for understanding
store location decisions, the effect of mergers, and the welfare impact of zoning regu-
lations and counterfactual industry structures.
In this paper I develop and estimate an empirically tractable model of store choice
in the supermarket industry that accounts for the spatial dimension of the market
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by explicitly modeling consumers’ heterogeneous travel costs of driving to the stores.
The choice of the supermarket industry is particularly relevant, as consumers visit
supermarkets frequently, on average more than twice a week, and spend a large portion
of their income on groceries and other household supplies. Frequency of trips and
persistency of behavior make the supermarket industry an ideal context for the study
of consumer store choice, as individuals, at least on average, will tend to make more
informed decisions once they have to repeat them over time.
The choice of a store (location) is only one dimension of a more complex shopping
decision (timing-location-bundle), and most of the difficulties in the study of store
choice arise from having to deal with the other dimensions as well. The agents’ choice
set can be very large and complex, as supermarkets carry thousands of products, and
retail outlets differentiate by location, so that the choice set will be different for differ-
ent consumers. Shopping decisions are inter-temporally dependent, as bundle choices
depend on previous purchases as well as current and future stocks, and consumers
have imperfect information about prices at different stores.
The empirical approach I take is to study the consumers’ choice of a store in a way
that allows to abstract from the choice of a bundle. This requires some restrictions on
the nature of consumers utility, but is very general in terms of how consumers choose
what to buy and where to buy it. The motivating assumption of such an approach
is that, although consumers have imperfect information about the exact bundle they
will end up buying, specific needs guide their decisions, and they ultimately make
their store choice based on a bundle they are planning to buy. Under this assumption
store choice is essentially a discrete choice problem, and I can identify how location,
store characteristics and bundle characteristics affect consumers’ decisions.
Starting from a very general model of consumer supermarket choice, I introduce
two sets of assumptions that allow me to estimate demand for supermarkets without
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imposing restrictions on the choice of the bundle. I start by considering a multinomial
logit specification that allows for a flexible model of consumers’ heterogeneity in
travel costs. I construct trip specific price indices and control for endogeneity of
price and expenditure to address the potential biases that could arise in presence
of expectational and measurement errors. To further support my results, I then
introduce a less restrictive moment inequality approach, first introduced in the context
of supermarket choice by Katz (2007).1 The inequality estimator does not require
a parametric distribution of the disturbances, and is robust against certain types
of measurement errors and consumers’ expectational errors. However, my focus on
travel costs ultimately stems from the desire to understand the welfare effects of policy
decisions such as land use regulations. Addressing these questions requires choice
probabilities under counterfactual market conditions, which require a distribution of
the disturbance.2 Therefore, I primarily focus on a discrete choice setup where a
few reasonable assumptions allow me to exploit point identification and the ability to
compute choice probabilities.
Using detailed micro-level data on trips and purchases made by a panel of house-
holds in a small market in New England, I estimate demand for supermarkets under
the two methodologies. While both inequalities and discrete choice agree on how
consumers trade off their travel costs for better store characteristics, I find that in
my application, where only a limited number of alternatives (i.e. stores) can be used
to construct the moments, the inequality approach fails to characterize the hetero-
geneity in consumers’ travel costs, and provides too little information about how
1Results from this unpublished job market paper are reported in Pakes (2010); Katz’s work is
there presented as a motivating example to the methodology.
2A number of studies using inequality conditions have run counterfactual analysis. These studies
however, use the methodology to estimate cost and supply side parameters which are then combined
to estimates of a demand system. See, for example, Ishii (2005) Crawford and Yurukoglu (2011) and
Ho, Ho, and Mortimer (2012).
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people value the individual stores. Conversely, the discrete choice approach allows to
identify consumers’ heterogeneity in travel costs, and does not require any restrictive
assumptions on the choice set of stores when data are available on all stores visited
by a household.
I specify utility as additively separable in travel costs, store characteristics and
utility from the bundle. I note that both differences in the shopping experience and
availability of substitute products might result in utility from the bundle being differ-
ent at different stores, so that people might “select” into particular stores depending
on the bundle. To address this issue I propose a control function approach, where
I allow the value of a purchase to vary by store and bundle characteristics. The
approach exploits significant variation in bundle characteristics, and in the market I
study it allows me to control for endogeneity of the expenditure coefficient.
In contrast to differentiated product markets, where the price of a product enters a
consumer’s utility as a product characteristic, the price level at a supermarket affects
a consumer’s utility in two ways: as a store characteristic, affecting a consumer’s
mean utility at a store, and as a bundle characteristic, affecting the expenditure on
the bundle. While the issue of endogenous prices has been extensively addressed in
the literature, to the best of my knowledge, this is the first paper to directly address
endogeneity of expenditure. If unobservable store characteristics are correlated with
price, then they are also correlated with expenditure; if the difference in utility from a
purchased bundle varies across store and bundle characteristics, then expenditure will
be endogenous as well. In the market I study variation over time in (relative) prices
is very limited, and the inclusion of store fixed effects alleviates much of the issue of
price endogeneity. Conversely, I note that price and store size are positively correlated.
Thus a major concern arises if households prefer larger stores for larger bundles. By
including an interaction between store size and “real quantity” purchased, I estimate
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the coefficient on expenditure controlling for bundle size.
The model predictions match very closely both the number of trips and the overall
revenue at the stores. Implied substitution patterns are fairly rich, as they depend
on the relative distribution of household locations and travel costs across different
demographic segments, and on the relative shopping habits within these segments.3
Distance plays a major role in a household’s decision about which store to shop at,
as people tend to concentrate their trips to stores that are close to their residence.
Furthermore, people value stores differently and trade off additional travel time for
better store characteristics. Individual store fixed effects reflect how consumers value
both the location and the attributes of a store. Differentials in preference for stores
correspond to a distance of up to 3.3 miles, or equivalently a driving time of 19.5
minutes, between the most and least preferred store in the market. Limited variation
in store characteristics and relative prices hampers my ability to estimate the effect
of price on the mean utility from a store. A small negative coefficient on bundle
expenditure suggests that consumers are sensitive to price in proportion to their
anticipated bundle. At the same time, selection is important, as consumers show a
strong preference for variety and assortment, and tend to shop at larger stores for
larger bundles.
The model’s specification enables the study of the welfare consequences of various
policy changes across different groups of consumers. I use the estimates of the multi-
nomial logit specification to study the welfare impact, as well as the effect on trip and
expenditure shares, of 1) the closing of each one of the stores and 2) the relocation of
one of the stores in the market. These two counterfactuals exemplify a large number
of questions that can be answered within this framework. As the welfare measures I
3Note that the IIA property holds only at the individual trip level, as both the bundle and the
household’s location and travel costs affect a consumer’s decision.
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construct are based on the assumption that consumers do not adjust to the change in
the set of alternatives by changing their shopping habits, they should be considered
an upper bound to the welfare loss, or alternatively a lower bound to the welfare gain.
These measures should also be considered as short run, as I assume no response by
stores.4
I find that the removal of a store produces significant welfare losses across all
segments of consumers, ranging from 8.2% to 44.4% reduction in consumer surplus
depending on the store considered. The impact however is extremely different across
consumer segments, depending on differences in travel costs, geographic distribution,
and distribution of bundle characteristics across consumer segments. The replace-
ment of one of the stores has more subtle effects then its simple removal: not only
will the original location affect how people substitute away from the store, but also
the new location will affect people substituting to the store from different locations.
By computing trip-specific choice probabilities and expected expenditures, I construct
predicted expenditures and trips at different stores under the alternative counterfac-
tuals. As the IIA property holds only at a trip level, substitution patterns across
stores reflect the geographic distribution of consumers as well as the distribution of
their bundle choices. Competition among stores as implied by the model fully cap-
tures the spatial dimension of the market and the observed heterogeneity in consumer
habits.
This paper contributes to the large literature on retail markets and spatial compe-
tition by proposing a model of consumer store choice in the supermarket industry that
allows to identify consumers travel costs and is suitable for policy analysis. Previous
4This might be a justifiable restriction in the industry: physical limitations prevent stores to
change most of their characteristics in the short run, and pricing strategies in the supermarket
industry are typically set at a higher level than the individual store, so that a supermarket’s reaction
to a change in local competition is very unlikely to radically alter its pricing strategies.
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studies of consumer store choice have generally used various reduced-form approaches
or have reduced the dimensionality of the problem by simplifying the choice of bun-
dles. In the marketing literature the main focus is on retailers, usually considering
segments of consumers, aggregate effects of choice and broad strategy questions.5
Furthermore, the use of probabilistic models does not allow for policy analysis under
counterfactual market conditions. 6
Industrial organization studies of the supermarket industry have often limited
their attention to how the spatial dimension affects market structure. Smith (2004),
for example, measures the extent to which cross-elasticities between stores enhance
market power by chain stores. Beresteanu and Ellickson (2006) analyze competition
in the industry using a dynamic model of chain level competition. Ellickson (2007)
studies the role of endogenous fixed costs. Griffith and Harmgart (2008) evaluate the
effect on market structure and consumers’ surplus of restrictive land use regulations
without accounting for consumer travel costs. Supermarket choice has also been
considered in a number of papers aimed at measuring the biases of standard consumer
price indices. Hausman and Leibtag (2009) for example, study the choice across
different formats to measure the outlet substitution bias of the CPI. Griffith, Leibtag,
Leicester, and Nevo (2008) instead, look at the “timing” and “quantity” biases that
arise from ignoring consumers’ choice of how much and when to buy.
A few papers in the empirical literature on spatial competition have considered
5For example, Carpenter and Moore (2006) study the effects of consumer demographics on retail
format choice; always in the context of store format, Reutterer and Teller (2009) study the role of
the shopping occasion, operationalized by different trip types; Rhee and Bell (2002) consider cherry-
picking and main store allegiance using transition probabilities. Ellickson and Misra (2008) estimate
a discrete game of firms pricing strategy to explain how local market conditions and competitors’
choices affect supermarket chains’ pricing strategies.
6Applications of the Dirichlet and Negative Binomial models include Wrigley and Dunn (1984),
Wrigley and Dunn (1985), Keng and Ehrenberg (1984); the Dynamic Markov model was introduced
in Burnett (1973). Leszczyc, Sinha, and Timmermans (2000) propose a dynamic hazard model that
accounts for timing and location using a factor analytic structure of store attributes and location.
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consumer store choice, generally in contexts where the bundle of products to choose
from is small. Davis (2006), for example, studies spatial competition and market
power in the movie theater market. Using aggregate data on shares and the observed
geographic distribution of consumers he extends the random coefficients model by
Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995) to account for consumers’ preferences for geo-
graphic proximity. Most closely related to the current work, Katz (2007) was the
first to integrate micro-level data with driving time, and estimates consumer travel
costs using a moment inequality approach. The model, however, does not allow to
study consumer behavior under counterfactual conditions and is not suitable for pol-
icy analysis.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. I first provide a brief descrip-
tion of the industry in section 2. In section 3 I describe the data, provide descriptive
statistics for the sample and discuss some of the patterns observed in the data. In
sections 4 and 5, respectively, I introduce the general model and discuss the empirical
implementation. I discuss the results in section 6. Section 7 presents the counterfac-
tuals and section 8 concludes. Appendices A.1 and A.2 present the GMS procedure by
Andrews and Soares (2010) as adapted here for inference using moment inequalities,
and discuss construction of the price indices used in the paper.
1.2 The Industry
The supermarket industry is a multi-billion dollar business with sales of over $584
billion and 3.4 million employees in 2011. According to the Annual Retail Trade
Report from the U.S. Census Bureau, sales at grocery stores accounted for 13.6% of
total retail sales in 2010 (12.9% supermarkets only). This value was third behind
the total retail sales of motor vehicle and parts dealers and general merchandisers,
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respectively accounting for 19.4%, and 15.8% of the market.
The Food Marketing Institute, the industry trade organization for food distri-
bution and retail, defines a traditional supermarket as a store offering a full line of
groceries, meat, and produce with at least $2 million in annual sales and up to 15%
of their sales in general merchandise. In 2010, there were 36,569 supermarkets in the
US carrying an average of 38,718 items. The median size of a store was 46,000 sq. ft.,
in a slightly decreasing trend since the peak of 48,750 sq. ft. in 2006. According to
USDA estimates, Americans spent 5.5% of their disposable income on food-at-home
in 2011. The average transaction expenditure in a supermarket was 26.78$, and con-
sumers made an average of 2.2 trips per week to a supermarket.7 Outside of the
supermarket category fall convenience stores, the other main grocery store category,
offering a limited line of high convenience items and accounting for sales lower than
$2 million.
In the last decades innovations in the industry have brought to the emergence
of a wide variety of (supermarket) formats including superstores, “fresh stores” and
limited-assortment stores. Superstores are large supermarkets, with at least 30,000
sq. ft., generating annually $12 million or more in revenues, and offering an expanded
selection of non-food items as well as specialty departments and extensive services.
Fresh stores emphasize perishables and offer center-store assortments that differ from
those of traditional retailers, especially in the areas of ethnic, natural and organic
(Whole Foods, Publix GreenWise, The Fresh Market). Limited-assortment stores are
low-priced grocery stores with limited assortment of center-store and perishable items
(Aldi, Trader Joes, and Save-A-Lot).
Over the last few decades other types of retailers have started to offer food and
grocery items. These non-traditional grocery retailers include mass merchandisers
7Source: http://www.fmi.org/research-resources/supermarket-facts.
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and wholesale clubs. Mass merchandisers like Walmart, Kmart, and Target, are stores
selling primarily hardlines, clothing, electronics, and sporting goods but also grocery
and non-edible grocery items. Wholesale clubs are membership based retail/wholesale
stores with a varied selection and limited variety of products presented in a warehouse-
type environment usually carrying a grocery line dedicated to large sizes and bulk
sales (Sams Club, Costco, BJs).
The supermarket industry today works on high-volume low-margins, with net
profits of 1.09% in 2010, and is characterized by intense competition in price and
services offered across and within a wide range of store formats. Modeling super-
market choice can be very hard, and requires a good understanding of the structure
of local geographic markets and substitution across formats. The emergence of non-
traditional grocery stores has made the task even more complicated, as multipurpose
shopping makes it very difficult to identify what caused a consumer to choose a store.
1.3 The Data
I use the IRI Marketing Dataset (see Bronnenberg, Kruger, and Mela (2008))
which contains data on store sales and individual consumer purchases for 31 packaged
goods categories for the years 2001 through 2007. The store sales data contains
product sales, pricing, and promotion data for items sold in 50 U.S. markets. In two
U.S. markets (Eau Claire, Wisconsin and Pittsfield, Massachusetts), the store level
data are supplemented with panel-level purchase data and cover the entire population
of stores. Further information is available regarding store characteristics such as
location, type and estimated activity, as well as detailed household level information
and market demographics.
As data on trips are available only for the micro level data, I restrict my attention
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to a panel of households in Pittsfield, Massachusetts. Using the longitude and latitude
data for households residence and store location, I integrate the data by calculating
distance and driving time to the stores using Google API (Application Programmable
Interface). The dataset records all trips made by the households to the entire pop-
ulation of stores, including traditional supermarkets, convenience and drug stores,
department stores and mass merchandisers. Due to confidentiality agreements, stores
cannot be identified by chain name; however, each store is assigned with unique store
and chain identifiers that allow to detect chain membership of a store.
Data on trips made by the panelists are separate form the category data, and
include a store identifier, the time and day of the purchase and the total dollar
amount spent. In some cases, trip files have multiple records very close in time for
the same panelist at a given store; this could be for a variety of reasons, not necessarily
indicating separate trips. As a rule of thumb I consider consecutive records within
two hours as being one trip only. Panel data from the category files contain a product
identifier, the quantity, price and store of purchase for all products sold within the
categories at the weekly level. I recover the bundle of products purchased in a given
trip to a store by aggregating all items bought by a household at the store in a given
week; if a household visits a specific store more than once in a given week, I split
the weekly expenditure across categories proportionally to the trip totals; that is,
if a household bought a box of Cheerios for three dollars in one of two trips to a
given store, the three dollars will accrue to the “cold cereals” category expenditure
in the two trips proportionally to their relative totals. Fortunately a vast majority of
household/week observations involve only one trip per week to a specific store.
In the national sample of store sales data 17604 items were sold in 31 categories
and 50 markets. Of these, 4851 were sold in Pittsfield supermarkets, of which 4054
were sold in more than one store, and 3162 in more than one chain. Items sold in
11
more than one store account for almost 96% of transactions and more than 99% of
expenditures; items sold in more than one chain account for over 86% of transactions
and almost 96% of expenditures. I use the aggregate sales data to construct individual
trip specific price indices as a weighted average of category specific indices using as
weights the trip share of expenditures in the categories. A separate appendix discusses
the construction of price indices in more detail.
1.3.1 The Sample
By considering only panelists who are consistently active every month of a given
year, and for which I possess detailed geographic and demographic information, I
get a sample of 2362 households, making 285,309 trips in 2003. I focus on 2003
because it is the year in which the largest number of households are consistently
active throughout the year. In the context of moment inequalities I further restrict
the sample to a subset of 1213 households active for the entire seven years of the
dataset to ensure a larger number of observations for each household. Although the
number of observations and the variability in consumer demographics is different, the
two samples are very similar in terms of the descriptive statistics and data patterns
I now present for the larger sample.
Out of the 285,309 trips made in 2003, 259,460 were made to traditional super-
markets. Substitution to other retail formats is extremely low, especially to mass
merchandiser stores, accounting for only 666 trips.8 Department stores typically of-
fer a combination of grocery products and general merchandise making analysis of
store choice a lot more complicated; however, in the market analyzed most of gro-
cery shopping is concentrated at traditional supermarkets, making it safe to exclude
8Note that the actual number of trips to department stores might well be larger than the number
observed; trips to department stores, and other stores not in the national IRI sample of stores, are
included in the sample only if they involve purchases within the 31 product categories.
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department stores from the analysis. I also exclude the 25,091 trips were made to
drug and convenience stores, accounting for below 3% of expenditure. Drug stores
are not close substitutes to supermarkets; they are smaller and less assorted, and
households planning purchase of a specific bundle rarely view a drug store as a viable
option. Additionally, people visit drug stores for alternative reasons to that of buying
groceries, and a large number of the trips observed might be driven by the need of
prescription drugs or other contingencies.
A possible concern that might be raised is that of sample selection. In general, one
might expect over-participation of price sensitive consumers seeking the benefits of
participating into the program,9 and under-participation of time sensitive consumers.
If selection is based on unobservables, the magnitude and importance of the selection
problem, and its impact on a model’s estimates, are very hard to assess. Collection of
the panel data by IRI is based on either showing a card at a participating retailer, or
self reporting by means of a scanner. While participation in the sample can be time
consuming for scanner panelists, making that of sample selection a possible concern,
this is not the case for consumers using a card. Given the lower compliance rate of
scanner panelists, IRI increased the use of cards over the years, and all the households
in my sample were card panelists. Very similar to the use of a loyalty card, the use
of the card is very simple, and the issue of sample selection, if present at all, is going
to be marginal.
In the final dataset I observe 259,415 trips made by 2362 households to the seven
supermarkets in Pittsfield. Throughout the paper I label the supermarkets with the
letters A to G for confidentiality purposes; the alphabetical ordering chosen reflects
the stores’ estimated revenues, store A having the highest revenues. The seven stores
9Although I do not possess details about the IRI program, consumers participating in such
programs are typically rewarded by the data collecting agency with reward points to be redeemed
in merchandizing.
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belong to four chains and are all participating stores in the IRI’s national sample.
Table 1.1 provides descriptive demographic information as well as information on
expenditure, number of weekly visits, distance and driving time to the store visited.
The sample is fairly representative, with an average income of $48,000 and a median of
$40,000; the median family size is 2, and the average size is 2.53; 21% of the household
are composed of one person; 63% of the heads of a household are married, 51% are
over 55 years of age, 5% is under 35; 26% of the households have young children.
On average people drive 8.5 minutes and 3.1 miles to visit a supermarket. Average
expenditure on a trip is $44.6, the median is $27.1. Households visit a supermarket
on average 2.11 times a week, a their median and mean weekly expenditure are
respectively $79.1 and $94.2. Figure 1 shows the geographic distribution of households
and stores. Households in the sample are well representative of the relative population
in Pittsfield census blocks, and the variability in households’ driving time to the stores
is extremely high.
1.3.2 Data Patterns
I now present some of the patterns observed in the data driving the results of my
empirical implementation. Distance is a major factor in households’ decision about
which store to shop at, as people tend to concentrate their trips to stores that are
close to their residence. This can be seen in panel (a) of Figure 2, which shows
the distribution of driving time to a supermarket; a large portion of trips involve
driving less than 10 minutes, and very few trips involve driving more than 20. This
information however, does not clarify whether people actually drive to the closest
stores. Panel (b) shows the distribution of the number of supermarkets visited by a
household within a year; a vast majority of people shop at multiple stores, with only
5% of the households shopping in less the three stores, and over 80% at more than
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three stores; only 83 people in the sample, representing 3.5 percent of the sample,
shop at only one store.
As the number of stores visited does not provide us with information about how
people actually distribute their trips across different stores, panels (c) and (d) of
Figure 2 look at the concentration of household trips across stores. Households seem
to substitute between stores across different occasions and most households do not
exhibit loyalty to a single store. Panel (c) shows the distribution of ranking of the
trips in terms of driving time from a household’s residence, rank 1 denoting a trip
to the closest store. The mode of the distribution is 1, and households concentrate
over 45% of their trips to the two closest stores. More informative about differences
across individuals is panel (d), which shows the distribution of the household level
Herfindahl Index of stores visited.10 Not only do people shop at different stores, they
also concentrate their visits at multiple stores. Over 60% of the households have an
index value lower than 0.5, representing a consumer splitting trips evenly between two
stores, and 33% have an index lower than 0.36, representing a 40-40-20 split across
three stores.
Figure 3 looks at trips and expenditures in some more detail. Panels (a) and
(b) show respectively the distribution of trip and weekly expenditure. Expenditures
vary significantly across households and shopping occasions. This variation can help
explain why people substitute between stores at different occasions: larger bundles
might be associated to a stronger preference for variety and/or lower prices. Peo-
ple’s decisions will reflect the trade-offs they face between prices, driving time and
assortment, and people might spit their shopping needs across multiple stores. Panel
(c) shows the distribution of the number of weekly visits to a supermarket. While
10I calculate the household level Herfindahl-Hirschman index as HHI =
∑
i s
2
j , where sj denotes
the share of visits made to store j out of all visits made by the household.
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the mode of the distribution is one, a majority of household-weeks involves multiple
trips. Panel (d) of Figure 3 presents how average expenditures differ across stores and
income groups. Average expenditure appears to be increasing in income at all stores
and varies significantly across stores. For all income classes average expenditure is
highest at store A and lowest at stores F and G; for stores B through E the average
expenditure is comparable.
Consumers are extremely heterogeneous in their shopping habits, in how often
they visit a store and in how much they spend. These differences depend in part on
consumers demographics, such as income and family size, in part on the choice set of
stores, in terms of their relative location with respect to the households residence, and
in part in heterogeneity in preference for shopping. Assessing whether the variation in
household’s habits depends on demographic factors rather than location or difference
in preferences can be very important when analyzing the impact of a policy or other
decision that affects the consumers’ choice set. I here investigate the issue by means
of reduced form regressions of average expenditure and average number of weekly
trips on a number of observable demographics and a measure that captures how close
(in terms of driving time) to the stores is a household location.
As a measure of a household’s proximity to supermarkets I consider an index that:
1. decreases in a store’s distance and 2. increases in the number of stores. Let dhs
denote driving time for household h to store s = 1, ..., S; I use
Lh =
∑
s
1
rs
d−1/2s ,
where rhs denotes the rank of store s in terms of distance, and a higher value indicates
a better location.11
11I also considered the more general specification Lh =
∑
s
1
rs
d−αs . However, convex specification
of travel costs (α ≥ 1) could not explain the observed variation in behavior. Conversely, the concave
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Table 1.2 shows the results of the two regressions. A larger average expenditure
is associated with higher income, larger families, home owners, married couples, well
educated people and people with longer working hours. Larger bundles are generally
associated with a lower number of trips, although large families and married couples
tend to both spend more and more often. Higher values of the index on location (that
is, a better location) are associated to more frequent trips and lower expenditure.
Although the coefficients on income, family size, working hours and location are
significant, the overall fit of the regressions is rather poor, suggesting that a major
determinant of households shopping habits is heterogeneity in preferences.
1.4 The Choice Model
I now introduce a general model of consumers’ shopping decision that makes some
simplifying assumptions on the nature of consumers’ utility, but is otherwise general
in terms of how consumers choose what to buy and where to buy it. The model allows
to analyze the determinants of store choice without making restrictive assumptions
on the choice of the bundle. Throughout the rest of the paper I interchangeably use
the words individual, consumer and household and denote individuals (households)
by h to avoid confusion between observations and individuals.
Assume that only stores within a reasonable distance are in a consumers choice
set and utility is additively separable in utility from bundle and store characteristics,
expenditure on the bundle and driving time. What a reasonable distance is will be
different for different households, and will typically depend on the transportation
means available to them, as well as on other market and household characteristics.
Characteristics that affect consumers’ utility might be the size and assortment of a
specification chosen(α = 1/2) produces results that are very close in terms of fitting the data, to the
use of a set of dummies with actual distances.
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store, availability of parking space, number of employees, number of checkouts, an
overall price level at the store.
Households periodically decide to visit a store to buy food, groceries and other
household supplies. Whether they visit a store at all, and what they eventually buy
depends on their preferences and on what they currently stock and plan to stock at
their homes. In each period the consumer makes a choice whether to visit a store,
which groceries to buy and where to buy them. Let the utility an individual h gets
from buying bundle b at store s in time t be equal to:
uhsbt = vhsbt + αhe(b, phst) + γh(dhs) +Xhsβ + ξhs + εhst. (1.1)
Total utility depends on utility from the bundle vhsbt, which is different for different
households and can vary across stores and shopping occasion. Xhs and ξhs represent
respectively observed store characteristics and an unobserved component that affect
the utility of a consumer. Utility depends also on expenditure on the bundle e(b, phst)
and the time it takes to drive to the store dhs. In a given time period, the utility of
not visiting a store is a function of past purchases:
uh0t =
∑
j
fj(bt−j) + εh0t (1.2)
The utility specification in (1.1) puts no restriction on utility from the bundle;
bundle choice can be dependent across shopping occasions, as bundles bought in
the past and available stocks might affect current choice, and consumers can split
their shopping needs across multiple stores. In general, the choice set will not be
the same for all consumers, as it depends on the consumers location and market
characteristics. All else equal, consumers will prefer stores that are closer, cheaper
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and have better characteristics. Consumers might go to a more expensive closer store
if the saving in travel time outweighs the increase in expenditure. Consumers might
go to a more distant store for a larger bundle if the store is cheaper or better assorted.
Consumers are heterogeneous in their preferences over stores and over bundles, and
their preferences can vary over time.
Consumers are typically uncertain about prices at different stores and about the
bundle they will end up buying. While in principle one could define expectation
over all possible bundles and assume that the consumer bases his choice on that
expected utility, this alternative is infeasible in practice, and ultimately unrealistic.
Considering the entire distribution of bundles they might buy when visiting a store
might be a far too complex decision process. Furthermore, estimating the choice
of a store simultaneously with the choice of a bundle would require restrictive and
unrealistic assumptions, so that misspecification of bundle choice is bound to happen
and might result in severe biases of the estimates of travel costs and preferences for
stores.
Assume instead that consumers make their choice based on a planned bundle.
Although product prices and availability, stock-outs and promotions can lead con-
sumers to buy substitute goods which were not used to formulate their store choice,
specific needs will most likely guide their decision. If consumers make their choice of a
store based on a bundle they are planning to buy, store choice is essentially a discrete
choice problem, and the researcher can study this “conditional” choice using standard
discrete choice techniques without imposing unrealistic restrictions on bundle choice.
The assumption that consumers base their store choice on a planned bundle might
seem somewhat restrictive; however, we should think about the planned bundle as
a “shopping list”, indicating the products in a household’s needs, but not specifying
the individual brands. To the extent that stores in the market considered are fairly
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homogeneous, the approach naturally addresses issues of product availability, since
even if a bundle observed was not available for purchase at another store, supermar-
kets will generally carry substitutes to the specific brand, so that a similar bundle
will be available at the alternative store. As in any other discrete choice model, only
differences in utility affect consumers’ decisions, and to consistently estimate the de-
terminants of store choice all that matters is to correctly pick up the differences in
utility across stores: to the extent that observable bundle and stores characteristics
allow us to capture this difference in utility, the estimates of mean utility from store
characteristics and disutility from driving time will not be affected by the assumption
of a planned bundle.
A commonly used assumption here would be to assume that utility from a given
bundle is the same whether you buy it at a store or another. In this case the determi-
nants of store choice would be independent of the bundle considered, and no further
assumption would be necessary. I note, however, that utility from a given bundle
might be different at different stores, either because of difference in the shopping
experience (e.g. people prefer a larger store for a larger bundle), or because of the
availability of substitute products. Therefore, people “select” into particular stores
depending on the bundle they are planning to buy, and estimating a model without
taking into account how different bundles affect consumers’ decisions might result in
biased estimates. To address this issue I propose a control function approach, where
I allow the utility of a purchase to vary by store and bundle characteristics. The
approach exploits significant variation in bundle characteristics, and in the market I
study allows me to control for the endogeneity of the expenditure coefficient.12
Optimality of choice requires that a consumer planning to buy bundle b at time t
12The approach can be easily generalized to address additional selection biases arising in markets
with less homogeneous competitors.
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will choose to visit store s if and only if
uhsbt ≥ uhs′bt for all s′, and uhsbt ≥ uh0t (1.3)
Alternatively, a consumer will choose not to visit a store whenever
uh0t ≥ uhsbt for all s. (1.4)
In the following section I introduce two alternative methodologies that, by adding
assumptions to the general model, allow us to study how location, store characteristics
and (eventually) bundle characteristics affect consumers choice of a store.
1.5 Empirical Implementation
The choice model presented above helps us understand the nature of consumers’
decision process when they choose where to shop. However, the bundles and prices
the consumers used to make their store choice are not the bundles and prices they
end up buying and paying, which are what the econometrician observes, and further
assumptions will be necessary. To make the model suitable for estimation, we need
to specify how utility from a bundle differs across stores, and a relation between the
bundle the consumer used to formulate his store choice and the bundle he actually
purchased.
Specifying how utility from a bundle differs across stores is important to avoid the
selection biases that might arise if either the shopping experience or the availability
of substitute brands make differences in utility across stores vary in bundle char-
acteristics. The appropriate assumption to use will typically depend on the specific
application. In the market I study supermarkets are extremely homogeneous in terms
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of the product they sell, and I only need to worry about the shopping experience. In
particular, as I discuss below in more detail, I observe that consumers show a strong
preference for variety and assortment, and tend to shop at larger stores for larger
bundles. Conversely, specifying a relation between the planned bundle and the bun-
dle actually purchased allows us to include observable bundle characteristics in the
analysis and to construct expenditure at the alternative stores. Note, however, that
even assuming that the planned bundle and the bundle actually purchased coincide
(i.e. no expectational error) only imposes conditions on those characteristics that
affect a consumer’s decision (e.g. total quantity, within categories purchases, etc.).
I now consider the empirical implementation under both standard discrete choice
techniques and a less restrictive moment inequality approach. Both methodologies
will use optimality conditions (1.3) and (1.4) to estimate demand for stores in a way
that the bundle choice will not be part of the econometric implementation. I first
consider a discrete choice specification that allows for a flexible model of consumers
heterogeneity in travel costs and is suitable for policy analysis. As the model does not
directly allow for measurement and expectational errors, I construct trip specific price
indices and control for endogeneity of price and expenditure. To further support my
results, I then introduce a less restrictive moment inequality approach that does not
require a parametric distribution of the disturbances, and is robust against certain
types of measurement errors and consumers expectational errors.
1.5.1 Discrete Choice
The discrete choice specification uses the necessary conditions of optimal store
choice as a basis for estimation. The model requires the we specify a parametric dis-
tribution for the random part of the utility, and does not directly include measurement
and expectational errors. I partially deal with these potential biases by constructing
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trip specific price indices and controlling for endogeneity of price and expenditure.
The model additionally requires that we specify the utility of the outside option and
the choice set of stores. Estimation involves finding the value of parameters for which
the likelihood function is maximized. The ability to compute choice probabilities in
turn, allows to use the estimates of the model to compute the choice probabilities
under counterfactual market conditions, and evaluate the welfare impact of changes
in the market structure.
By optimality conditions (1.3)-(1.4), a consumer planning to buy bundle b at time
t will choose to visit store s if and only if
uhsbt ≥ uhs′bt for all s′, and uhsbt ≥ uh0t
They will alternatively choose not to visit a store whenever
uh0t ≥ uhsbt for all s.
To make the model suitable for estimation I require the following additional assump-
tions:
DC1 Difference in utility from the bundle across stores depends only on observable
store and bundle characteristics. That is
vhsbt = vhbt + f(b,Xs), (1.5)
DC2 The utility of not visiting a store is a function of past purchases of a “real”
grocery unit:
uh0t =
∑
j
bjqt−j + εh0t (1.6)
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DC4 The distribution of εhst belongs to the GEV class.
Under assumption DC1 I restrict difference in utility across stores to depend on on
observable store and bundle characteristics. Assumptions DC2 and DC3 specify, re-
spectively, the utility of the outside option and the distribution of the disturbances.
As the model does not directly include measurement and expectational errors, con-
sumers have no uncertainty, and the prices and bundles the econometrician observes
are the prices and bundles consumers used to guide their choices. Note, however,
that under assumption DC1, this is only imposing that bundle characteristics affect-
ing consumers’ decision are “observable” via the bundle purchased. On the other
hand, the assumption that consumers make no expectational errors can be relaxed
by imposing an orthogonality condition.
Let εht denote the vector of disturbances εhst for s ∈ Sh, with joint distribution
f(εht). Under assumptions DC1-DC5, the probability consumer h planning to buy
bundle b will visit store s is equal to:
Phsbt =
∫
εht
I(uhsbt > uhs′bt∀s′ 6= s)f(εht)dεht (1.7)
Estimation By assuming that the structural error εhst is distributed extreme value,
type I, the discrete choice model reduces to a multinomial logit which I estimate via
Maximum Likelihood.13 As a time unit I use a week, and construct an observation
for weeks in which a household has not visited a store. As I do not observe a planned
bundle for these weeks, I use a household-specific “average bundle” to construct utility
in the stores in weeks with no visits. I also construct a variable specifying whether a
trip is the first or a subsequent trip during the week and set the choice probability of
13I also considered nesting choices of a store separately from the outside option. The data however
rejected this nesting structure with estimated λs of 1.
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choosing the outside option to zero for subsequent trips within a week.14 To specify
the utility and choice probability of the outside option, I use store level price indices
to construct quantities purchased of a real grocery unit in previous weeks.
The number of stores in the market is too low for consistent estimation of util-
ity from store characteristics. Store dummies thus capture mean utility from both
observable and unobservable characteristics. This limitation in the data inhibits my
ability to infer a price elasticity and model the supply side. The model specification
however is easily applied to larger markets where larger variability in store character-
istics would allow to identify their effect on consumer utility.
I model consumers’ heterogeneity as a function of observables. Heterogeneity en-
ters the model in several ways. First, consumers are heterogeneous in their propensity
to visit a supermarket. I specify utility from the outside option as linear in the real
quantity purchased in previous weeks relative to the average quantity purchased by
the household. Similarly, I use a household-specific average bundle to construct utility
in the stores in weeks with no visits. Finally, and most importantly, consumers are
heterogeneous in their disutility from driving to a store, not only because of differences
in preferences, but also because of differences in location: in my actual specification
I model disutility from driving time as quadratic,15 with an household specific slope
that varies with observable consumer demographics, that is:
γh(dhs, zh) = γ0dhs + γ1d
2
hs + γ
′
zzhdhs.
The model in principle allows for unobserved consumer heterogeneity and the
14The procedure used here is equivalent to that used in case of product availability, where choice
probability for a product which is not available is set to zero by specifying a price equal to infinity.
15The choice of a quadratic specification was driven by the data. I tried other functional forms
like the square root and the log, but these specifications did not fit the data better than a simple
linear specification. Conversely, the fit including a quadratic term improves significantly, and the
estimate of the coefficient on the quadratic term is robust to the model’s specification.
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use of random coefficients. Note, however, that unobserved heterogeneity in travel
costs and preference for stores cannot be separately identified, and a model includ-
ing heterogeneity in consumers’ preferences for stores might well be over-specified.
Furthermore, availability of detailed micro data allows me to directly model hetero-
geneity in travel costs as a function of observable consumer characteristics and as
a robustness check that unobserved heterogeneity in preference for stores does not
affect my estimates, I estimate a model in which I introduce a dummy to account for
an individual’s experience at the store; as I will discuss later when commenting the
results, the inclusion of such a dummy does not affect my estimates.
For each bundle b bought at store s in week t, I observe products purchased and
expenditure ej(b, pst) within 31 packaged goods categories, plus a residual expenditure
equal to the difference e(b, pst)−
∑
j ej(b, pst). Goods purchased in individual trips are
extremely different both in the category expenditure mix and in the within category
product mix: different households not only allocate their spending differently across
categories, but also choose different products within a given category. To construct
expenditure at alternative stores in a way to better reflect a trip/bundle specific
difference in expenditure, the construction of trip and household specific price indices
seems most appropriate. In my main model specification I construct expenditure at
the alternative stores for bundle b using category price indices p˜jst, so that, for all
s′ 6= s
e˜bs′t =
∑
j
ej(b, pst)
(
p˜js′t/p˜jst
)
.
To the extent that categories are sufficiently small and relative within category prices
do not significantly vary across stores, the use of category level price indices is almost
equivalent to the use of individual specific price indices. Even if this were not the
case, category specific price indices should be preferred for the likely better quality
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of the data used in their construction. Individual households buy only a limited
number of products, and are subject to continuous promotions making it very hard
for the researcher to construct an index based on that limited information. Finally,
the values for expenditure at alternative stores implied by different indices are very
close, and the estimates are robust to the way I construct the indices. Details on the
construction of price indices are presented in Appendix A.2.
A typical concern estimating demand in differentiated markets is that of price
endogeneity when unobservable characteristics are correlated with price. A way to
address this issue is the inclusion of store fixed effects capturing mean utility from
store observed and unobserved characteristics. In the presence of time variation in
unobservables and prices, however, fixed effects do not solve the endogeneity problem.
Nevertheless, the time variation both in store level and store-category level price in-
dices is very limited in the sample, and mainly due to trend and seasonal components.
As a robustness check I also consider a model specification with time varying store
effects, but the results are too similar to the more restrictive model to justify the
extra computational burden.
The price level of a store affects the way consumers decide which store to visit
in two ways: as a store characteristic, affecting a consumers mean utility at a store,
and as a bundle characteristic, affecting the expenditure on the bundle. While in
the absence of significant variation in price over time, the inclusion of store fixed
effects addresses the endogeneity of price, expenditure might be endogenous as well.
A major concern arises if households prefer more expensive stores for larger bundles;
as counterintuitive as this might seem, if households prefer larger stores (more as-
sortment) for their major shopping trips (higher expenditure) and larger stores are
pricier than smaller stores, then the estimated coefficient on expenditure will result to
be positive. As in the market I consider price and store size are positively correlated,
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I take a control function approach by including an interaction between store size and
“real quantity” purchased to estimate the coefficient on expenditure controlling for
bundle size.
Given all of the above, a consumers’ utility of visiting store s at time t is given
by:
uhsbt = αebst + ξs + βqqbtszs + γ0dhs + γ1d
2
hs + γ
′
zzhdhs + hst.
where szs denotes the size of store s. The utility of the outside option is set equal to
uh0bt =

∑
j bj q˜t−j + εh0t first trip of the week
−∞ otherwise
I normalize the scale of the utility by setting equal to zero the constant term in the
utility from the outside option. Under the assumption of an extreme value, type
I, distribution for the error terms εist, the choice probabilities have the closed form
expression:
Phsbt =
exp[uˆhsbt]
exp[uˆh0bt] +
∑S
s′=1 exp[uˆhs′bt]
As utility is linear in the parameters the log-likelihood function is globally concave
and attains a unique global maximum.
1.5.2 Moment Inequalities
The use of discrete choice techniques have been recently criticized because ex-
pectational and measurement errors typically result in downward-biased estimates of
price elasticities and over-prediction the impact of driving time.16 To further sup-
16This might be the case, for example, if individuals shop at stores that are cheaper for the goods
they are interested in- the presence and severity of the bias, however, depends on how one constructs
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port the validity of the discrete choice specification, I introduce here a less restrictive
moment inequality approach, first introduced in the context of supermarket choice
by Katz (2007). The inequality estimator does not require a parametric distribution
of the disturbances and is robust against certain types of measurement errors and
consumers’ expectational errors. Although the inequality approach does not allow
to analyze the welfare impact of changes in the market structure, the methodology
is a natural starting point to study the impact of driving time on store choice, and
comparing its results to those of the more restrictive discrete choice specification will
help us understand the implications of the assumptions used.
The idea behind the use of Moment Inequalities is that choice models generate
inequalities which can be used as a basis for estimation. The typical advantages of
such a methodology are that it does not require to restrict the agents’ choice sets, as
the researcher needs only to focus on a subset of reasonable alternatives, and it does
not require a parametric distribution of the disturbances. Furthermore, by looking
only at averages in differences in utility, the model can allow for expectational and
measurement errors. The generality of this approach, however, comes at the cost of
partial identification: while the actual estimates of the identified set can often be a
singleton, inference consists in finding the boundaries of the identified region. I here
present a model that is similar to Katz (2007) in terms of the optimality conditions
used for estimation, but differs from it in the assumptions made on consumer choice.17
The inequalities model moves from the necessary conditions of optimal store choice
to generate inequalities that are true for any store chosen and any alternative store
no matter what the bundle chosen is. Focusing on the determinants of the store
the price index. See also Pakes (2010).
17While Katz’s focus was the identification of consumers’ travel costs, the focus of this paper is
how these travel cost relate to consumers’ preference for stores, and how this relation is affected by
the nature of the bundle considered. As a result, my model allows the utility from a purchase to
vary in bundle and store characteristics.
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choice made by a consumer planning a particular bundle, the bundle choice will not
be part of the econometric implementation. The researcher will need to consider only
a small number of plausible alternatives rather then the entire set of stores. In fact,
the choice set can be very large and will typically be different for different consumers,
and having to specify for each consumer the choice set of stores, as well as the outside
option can be problematic when data are unavailable for all the relevant stores.
As the model allows for expectational and measurement errors, I need to introduce
some additional notation. Denote respectively Eh[·] and Ih the consumer’s expecta-
tion operator and information set. We can rewrite optimality conditions (1.3) and
(1.4) in terms of consumers’ expectations. A consumer planning to buy bundle b at
time t, will decide to visit store s if and only if
Eh[uhsbt|Ih] ≥ Eh[uhs′bt|Ih] for all s′, and Eh[uhsbt|Ih] ≥ Eh[uh0t|Ih]
Consider the difference operator ∆ and define ∆fdd′z ≡ f(d, z) − f(d′, z); then the
inequality can be written as:
Eh[∆uhss′bt|Ih] ≥ 0 (1.8)
Denote (h, s, b, t) a trip made by consumer h to store s planning to buy bundle b
in time t. For each observation in the data one can construct alternatives (h, s′, b, t)
given a rule for selecting s′, and for every such rule one can construct a moment whose
expectation is positive.
As product availability, pricing and promotions, will typically lead consumers to
buy substitute goods which were not used to formulate their store choice, the planned
bundle will typically be different from the bundle observed. However, consumers
build into their expectations pricing and availability of products, so that difference
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between the planned bundle and the bundle observed is the result of an expectational
error. Additionally, the econometrician only observes the prices actually paid by the
consumer, possibly with some measurement error, and not the prices the consumer
used to form his expectations.
Suppose now that the consumer was planning b∗ but once in the store bought b;
then consumer’s optimal choice generates the following inequality conditions:
Eh[∆uhss′b∗t|Ih] ≥ 0.
Denote respectively εehst, and ε
m
hst the consumer’s expectational error and the econo-
metrician’s measurement errors; we have that
∆uhss′bt = Eh[∆uhss′b∗t|Ih] + εehst (1.9)
and
∆e˜ss′bt = ∆ess′bt + ε
m
hst (1.10)
where ∆e˜ss′bt denotes the observable difference in expenditure. To construct the mo-
ments using an observable version of inequality conditions (8) I require the following
assumptions:
MI1 Difference in utility from the bundle across stores depends only on observable
store and bundle characteristics. That is
vhsbt = vhbt + f(b,Xs)
MI2 Consumer have idiosyncratic preferences for unobserved store characteristics
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around a time and consumer invariant mean. That is
ξhst = ξs + εhst
MI3 The expectational error has mean zero conditional on the consumer’s informa-
tion set Ih. That is
Eh[ε
e
hst|Ih] = 0
MI4 The measurement error on prices has mean zero and is uncorrelated with any
positive function g(·) of (instrumental) variables wh in the consumers informa-
tion set. That is
E[εmhst|g(wh)] = 0
Under assumption MI1 I restrict the difference in utility from the bundle across
stores to depend on store and bundle observable characteristics. Assumption MI2 sim-
ply gives an interpretation to the idiosyncratic component in ( 1.1), without though
specifying a distribution for it. Assumptions MI3 and MI4 impose conditions on the
conditional mean respectively of the expectational error εehst and of the measurement
error εmhst. Under assumptions MI1-4 we can rewrite the utility in (1.1) as follows:
uhsbt = vhbt + f(b,Xs) + αhe(b, phst) +Xhsβ + γh(dhs) + ξs + hst.
Inequality condition (1.8) is then
Eh[∆uhss′bt|Ih] = Eh[αh∆ess′bt|Ih]+∆f(b,Xss′)+∆Xss′β+∆γh(dhss′)+∆ξss′+∆hss′ ≥ 0
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Denote ∆u˜hss′bt the difference in utility observable by the econometrician; then
E[∆u˜hss′bt|g(wh)] = E[∆uhss′bt|g(wh)] + αhE[εmhst|g(wh)]
= Eh[∆uhss′b∗t|Ih] + Eh[εehst|Ih]
= Eh[∆uhss′b∗t|Ih] ≥ 0.
As ∆u˜hss′bt and wh are observable, our moment for estimation is
E[∆u˜hss′bt|g(wh)] ≥ 0. (1.11)
Estimation The model is partially identified and estimation focuses on finding the
boundaries of the identifiable set. If the model is also linear, the identifiable set
will be convex. Suppose f(b,Xs) is linear in parameters denoted by λ. Estimation
involves finding values of the parameters (αh, λ, β, γh) along with mean utility from
unobservables (ξs) such that the moment conditions are satisfied. If no such value
of the parameters exists, similarly to a GMM setup, one picks the value of θ =
(αh, λ, β, γh, ξs) that is ”closest” to satisfying all the moments. For estimation of the
identified set I follow Pakes, Porter, Ho, and Ishii (2011), whereas for specification
testing and construction of the confidence sets I use one of the moment selection
criteria considered in Andrews and Soares (2010). The idea behind moment selection
is that we require that only the binding moments are considered for inference (note
that at the boundary points of the identified set a subset of moments will be binding).
An observation in the dataset (h, s, b, t) is a trip made by household h (h =
1, .., nh), at store s (s = 1, .., S), buying a basket of goods b at time t. For each obser-
vation (h, s, b, t), one can construct alternatives (h, s′, b, t) given a rule for selecting s′.
Every rule thus generates a moment to be used for estimation. In general, depending
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on the rules used to construct the moments, the number of observations will vary
across different moment conditions, and the researcher has to take this into account
for inferential procedures.
I considered several sets of rules for constructing the moments, and I considered
moments both at the population level and at the household level, similarly to a panel
setup in a GMM context. To increase the number of trips observed at the household
level I consider only households who are consistently active during the entire seven
years of the dataset, so that in the final sample used for inequalities I observe 1213
households making over one million trips over seven years.
Let i denote an observation (h, s, b, t) in the data, and let yi denote the measurable
difference in utility ∆u˜hss′bt. Consider rules j = 1, ..., p for selecting alternatives
(s′): the choice model implies that, for any positive functions g(·) of (instrumental)
variables wi
Emj(yi, θ0)⊗ g(wi) ≥ 0 for j = 1, ..., p and i = 1, ..., N (1.12)
Let nj denote the number of observations for moment j, and consider the empirical
moment functions:
mj(y, θ) =
1
nj
nj∑
i
mj(yi, θ) (1.13)
where
mj(yi, θ) = αh∆e˜ss′bt + ∆f(b,Xss′|λ) + ∆Xss′β + ∆dhss′γh + ∆ξss′ .
If there exist a set of values of θ = (αh, λs, β, γh, ξs) such that the moment conditions
are satisfied, the estimate of the identified set will consist of those values; formally,
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one picks
Θˆ = {θ : m(y, θ) ≥ 0} (1.14)
If no such value of the parameters exists, similarly to a GMM setup, one picks the
value of θ that is ”closest” to satisfying all the moments. Let DF (θ) denote the
matrix of diagonal elements of the covariance matrix of the moments. Also, let
(·)− = min{·, 0} and consider a consistent estimate Dˆ of DF (θ). Estimation consists
in finding (one dimension at the time) either
Θˆ = arg min
θ∈Θ
||(Dˆ−1/2m(y, θ)−|| (1.15)
or
Θˆ = arg min
θ∈Θ
||(m(y, θ)−|| (1.16)
Household level moments are constructed similarly. Let nh denote the number of
trips made by household h. For each trip i made by household h we have that
Emh,j(y
h
i , θ0) ≥ 0 for j = 1, ..., p, h = 1, ..., nh. (1.17)
where j denotes one of the alternatives above. The empirical moment functions in
this case are:
mh,j(y
h, θ) =
1
nh
nh∑
i
mh,j(y
h
i , θ) (1.18)
While Pakes, Porter, Ho, and Ishii (2011) show that both estimation procedures
in (1.15) and (1.16) lead to consistent estimates, the construction of confidence sets
in inequalities setups can be computationally demanding and is still under debate
in the literature.18 Andrews and Soares (2010) introduced a generalized moment
18Numerous papers have considered inference and confidence sets for inequality models. A non-
comprehensive list of theoretical papers in this area includes Andrews and Soares (2010), Andrews,
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selection (GMS) procedure which provides confidence sets that are not asymptotically
conservative. I adapt one of the selection criteria suggested by the authors to the case
in which moments have a different number of observations, and introduce a way to
characterize a 1−α confidence interval by means of a grid search around the vertices
of the estimated set. Appendix A.1 describes the procedure in more detail.
1.6 Results
I now present the results from the two alternative methodologies. I report the
estimates of the multinomial logit model first and then compare them to those of the
inequality approach.
1.6.1 Multinomial Logit
Table 1.3 presents the estimates from a variety of multinomial logit specifications.
The table reports standard errors in parentheses to the right of the coefficient esti-
mates. Under all model specifications I tried, the utility from the outside option is
decreasing in the “real” purchases from previous weeks, as expressed by the negative
estimates of b1 − b4. While ex-ante agnostic about the sign of these coefficients, the
negative sign suggests that people are persistent in their habits. The probability that
a household visits a store in a given week is increasing in previous weeks purchases.
This is true even after controlling for individual characteristics.19
Mean utility from store characteristics is estimated very precisely, and moving
from one specification to another only changes the scale, keeping the relative differ-
ence in mean utility between two stores, and thus the respective choice probabilities,
Berry, and Jia (2004), Andrews and Shi (2012), Beresteanu and Molinari (2008), Chernozhukov,
Hong, and Tamer (2007).
19Models (1)-(5) use the relative quantity purchased by the household. Results using the absolute
quantity (not reported here) were very similar.
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unchanged. The estimates highly conform to my expectations, reflecting both the lo-
cation of a store (in terms of the amenities close to it) and the value of its attributes.
The model predictions match very closely both the number of trips and the model
overall revenue at the stores (see tables 1.6 and 1.7).
Disutility from driving time is estimated to be negative in all specifications, and
the quadratic term in models (2) through (5) is significantly positive, suggesting de-
creasing marginal travel costs consistently with Davis (2006). Consumers are signifi-
cantly heterogeneous in their value of driving time. Travel costs decrease in income.
as expressed by a negative estimate of γY , entering the model interacting distance d
with the inverse of income. Disutility from driving time is higher for larger families,
families with no children, senior households, families with a high working load and
families with a higher education level. Families with one or more children, young
households, families with a low or medium work load and married couples have lower
disutility. Identification comes from observed household behavior rather than from
the differential effect on demand of the nearby population and the estimates are all
significant and robust to the model specification.20
Driving time is expressed in minutes to go and come back from a store, and
estimates of travel costs and utility at a store appear very reasonable. The average
household would be willing to drive between 23.6 minutes for model (1), and 19.5
minutes for models (3) and (4), to visit store A rather than store G. As stores G and
A are respectively the most and least preferred stores in the market, these numbers
imply that differentials in preference for stores in the market correspond to a distance
ranging between zero and up to 3.3 miles.21 The numbers reported in the last row
20The only coefficient not estimated precisely is γEDU2, involving a residual group of households,
not reporting their educational attainment, which I didn’t want to include in the reference group
(low education).
21The distance is based on the average trip made by the average household driving at a speed of
20 miles per hour.
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of table 1.3 are constructed using store G as a starting location, so that the actual
values will be smaller moving away from that location because of decreasing marginal
travel costs.
Most problematic is the estimation of the coefficient on expenditure on the bun-
dle. As consumers should consider the relative expenditure across stores for a given
bundle, a positive α cannot be explained in economic terms. Conversely, consumers
persistently shop at different supermarkets, so that a valid model of store choice
should yield a small but negative estimate of α. The issue here might be one of endo-
geneity of expenditure; as in the market I consider price and store size are positively
correlated, the positive estimate of α in models (1) and (2) likely arises from omission
of a “taste for assortment” when buying larger bundles. In model (3) I include an
interaction between store size and “real quantity” purchased to estimate the coef-
ficient on expenditure controlling for the size of a bundle.22 The negative estimate
of α when controlling for bundle size is robust to the model specification, and all
coefficient estimates are robust to the choice of the price index.23
The effect of the price level of a store is fully captured by the store fixed effects, ξs.
An endogeneity issue arises if variation in the price level over time is correlated with
a store’s unobservable characteristics; time variation in price however, is very limited
in the sample, and is uncorrelated with households’ characteristics and driving time
to the stores (which are time invariant). As a robustness check, model (4) reports
the estimates of a model with time varying store effects. The model is identical to
model (3), but I now spit the sample in ten 5-weeks periods and allow store effects
to vary over these time periods. The resulting estimates are almost identical to those
22I could have used here alternative functional forms. However, in the market analyzed variability
in store size is very limited, and the use of an interaction term produces results equivalent to the
use of dummies for size categories, provided monotonicity in their coefficients.
23This is not surprising, since households persistently shop at different stores and different indices
results in very small changes in relative expenditures.
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of model (3). For model (4), the table reports the mean values of store effects over
time; variation in the individual values (not reported here) is very limited, and does
not suggest any systematic change (over time) in the relative utility from the stores.
A final issue regards households’ heterogeneity in preference for the stores. The
model allows for heterogeneity both over time and across household via the i.i.d. error
term εhst (note that ξsh = ξs + εhst), but violation of the i.i.d. assumption might bias
the estimates of the driving time coefficients. A natural way to address this issue
would be the use of random coefficients; while feasible in principle, the inclusion of
random coefficients would be computationally burdensome, and the model might well
be under-identified. Instead, as a robustness check, model (5) presents the estimates
of a model in which I include a very specific form of heterogeneity; I introduce a
dummy to account for an individuals experience at the store, taking the value of
one if an individual has visited the store at least ten times. Overall estimates of
such a model should be disregarded because of dependence of the right hand side
variable (the dummy) on the dependent variable (the store choice). However, the signs
and magnitudes of coefficients closely match the estimates from the other models,
suggesting that, if there is indeed unobserved heterogeneity in consumers’ preference
for stores, it ultimately does not affect the other coefficients24.
1.6.2 Inequalities
Table 1.4 presents the estimates from a parsimonious model specification in which
households are homogenous in both their travel costs (that is γh = γ), and decide to
24Not surprisingly the value of the likelihood function increases significantly, and the coefficient
on experience “outweighs” the store fixed effects. This specification however, cannot be used in
counterfactual analysis because of the endogeneity of the experience coefficient; if a store for which
an individual has experience is removed or moved to another location it is unreasonable to assume
that the individual will not gain experience in another alternative place, and/or “reset” his experience
at the store that is being moved.
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shop at differentiated stores where mean utility from store characteristics, captured
by store fixed effects ξs, for s ∈ {A,B, ..., G}, is the same across households.25 Given
the limited number of alternatives which could be used to construct the moments,
it was only by comparing store pairs that I was able to identify store fixed effects.
Under this specification I use all the visits made to each individual store s to construct
7-by-6, 42 moments, using as alternative stores s′, for each store s′ 6= s. Under this
model specification the estimate of the identified set turned out to be a set.
Table 1.4 reports the highest and lowest values in the identified set for each of
the parameters, and 95% confidence bounds are reported in parenthesis. The last
row of the table further reports the implied additional time a person would drive
to visit store A rather than store G. As a level normalization I set the utility from
visiting store A equal to zero, and as a scale normalization I set the coefficient on
expenditures α to -1.26 A more detailed description of the identified set and more
details on the characterization of confidence bounds for set estimates are discussed in
Appendix A.3 and Table A.1.
The estimates of the model conform to expectations, with a significantly negative
utility from driving time, and a magnitude that seems reasonable in relation to mean
utility from store characteristics. These values are very similar to those found with
the multinomial logit specification, and the two models agree on how consumers trade
off their travel costs for better store characteristics. In particular, the estimates of
the inequality model suggest that a household would be willing to drive between
8 to 19 additional minutes to visit store A rather than store G. The upper bound
25I also considered alternative rules to construct the moments, heterogeneous households, con-
sumer types, and individual household coefficients. I tried to instrument moments using a constant,
income, family size, children, working hours, marital status, age, education level and positive trans-
formations of them. Flexible specifications however, resulted in unbounded estimates or rejection of
the model.
26This form of scale normalization is necessary because, differently from discrete choice techniques,
there is no variance of the error term scaling the utility.
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of 19 minutes is extremely close to the value of 19.5 minutes from the multinomial
logit. Furthermore, the quadratic specification of travel costs in the multinomial logit
implies that the value from a household’s residence would be lower, and the inequality
model both scales the utility by normalizing the coefficient on expenditure and does
not control for bundle size, which could result in overestimation of travel costs and,
therefore, underestimation of the store G to A value.
The estimates of store fixed effects capture some aspects of the data. Recall that
the labeling of stores A-G corresponds to the estimated overall revenue at the stores.
Revenue at a store is determined both by its characteristics and its location; we expect
values of mean utility from a store to reflect revenues, even if not monotonically.
Consistently, we observe that stores A, C, D and E are preferred to stores F and G
everywhere in the set. These estimates however, provide too little information on
how people value these stores, and the assumption of homogeneous consumers seems
too restrictive. I further considered weighting observations by a household’s number
of trips, or using instruments to further restrict the estimate of the identified set, but
both directions resulted in no parameter value satisfying the moment conditions and
rejection of the model.
1.7 Counterfactuals
The multinomial logit model can be used for a wide range of policy analysis
regarding zoning regulations, and can also be applied to the study of local competition
and store location decisions. I use the estimates of model (3) (reported in table 1.3)
to evaluate the welfare impact, as well as the effect on trip and expenditure shares,
of 1) the closing of each individual store in the market and 2) the relocation of store
B to a likely new location 6 miles away north-east of the original location. These two
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counterfactuals exemplify a large number of questions that can be answered within
this framework.
Denote by i a trip (h, s, b, t). Under a multinomial specification the expected
consumer surplus takes the convenient closed form
E(CSi) =
1
αYh
log
( ∑
s∈S∪0
exp[uˆhsbt]
)
+ c,
where αYh is the marginal utility of income of household h,
∑
s∈S∪0 exp[uˆhsbt] is the
denominator of the logit choice probability, and uˆhsbt for s = 0 denotes the expected
utility of the outside option.27
Under the logit specification it is straightforward to analyze the impact on con-
sumer surplus of a change in the set of alternatives, or in one of the attributes of one
of the alternatives. Let the superscripts 0 and 1 denote respectively before and after
a change; then, for any trip i, the percentage change in consumer surplus is given by:
%∆E(CSi) = log
[( ∑
s∈S∪0
exp[uˆ1hsbt]
)
/
( ∑
s∈S∪0
exp[uˆ0hsbt]
)]− 1 (1.19)
For each trip I construct after-the-change choice probabilities and expected expen-
ditures at each of the alternatives s = A, ..., G by using the standard logit formulas:
P 1i,s = exp[uˆ
1
hsbt]/
( ∑
s′∈S∪0
exp[uˆ1hs′bt]
)
(1.20)
and
E1(e(b, pst)) = e˜bstP
1
i,s (1.21)
27Rosen and Small (1981) show the result when the error terms are iid extreme value and utility
is linear in income (details can also be found in Train (2009)). All results that follow measure
percentage changes in consumer surplus that are independent of income elasticity.
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where P 1i,s denotes the probability that household h visits store s after the change.
Using (1.19)-(1.21), I construct aggregate measures of consumers welfare change
as well as change in the number and share of trips and change in expenditure shares.
I do so by summing expected consumer surplus, choice probabilities and expected
expenditures over the trips I observe keeping the bundles fixed. I evaluate the welfare
change overall, and by household types defined by income, family size, number of
children,working hours code, age, education and marital status.
The welfare measures I construct are based on the assumption that consumers
do not adjust to the change in the set of alternatives by changing their shopping
habits, such as the frequency of their trips and their average expenditure. As long as
individuals react to a change in the set of alternatives the measures I provide should
be considered an upper bound to the welfare loss (or alternatively a lower bound to
the welfare gain) due the removal of (each) one of the stores, or the replacement of
store B.
These measures should also be considered as “short run”, as I assume no response
on part of the stores. While physical limitations do not allow stores to change most of
their characteristics at least in the short run (a store for example cannot significantly
change its size), it is possible that a store would reconsider its pricing strategies in
response to a major change in the number of visitors. Although the model I estimate
could be used to model the supply side of the industry, for example by adding a
pricing equilibrium condition, the limited variation in store characteristics in my
sample hampered my ability to estimate price elasticities. Note however, that pricing
strategies in the supermarket industry are typically set at a higher level than the
single store and for wider areas than the small town of Pittsfield. Additionally, a
supermarket’s response to a change in local competition is very unlikely to radically
alter its pricing strategies.
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Table 1.5 presents the welfare impact overall and on different segments of con-
sumers under both counterfactuals. Columns labeling A through G refers to which
store has been removed, column B-B’ refers to the replacement of store B to a new
location. The removal of a particular store affects households differently; households
who live closer, shop more frequently and spend more in a given store will suffer more
than those who live further away and shop there less frequently. As households are
otherwise homogeneous in their preference for stores, difference in the welfare loss
from store removal across groups is fully explained by one or more of the following
reasons: 1) difference in travel costs; 2) difference in location; 3) difference in size of
the planned bundles.
The last row of table 1.5 shows the overall welfare impact of store removal on the
population considered. Removal of store B produces the largest welfare loss (44.4%),
followed by removal of stores A (43.9%) and C (40.3%); removal of the other stores
produces a much smaller loss. The overall loss is determined mainly by the number
of trips at the stores, being stores B, A and C respectively the most visited stores.
The welfare effects however, vary significantly across household groups.
The first three rows of table 1.5 show the effect on households who’s income is
below 25,000$ (low), between 25,000$ and 65,000$ (medium), and over 65,000$ (high).
Wealthier families are more affected than low income households from the removal of
store A (51.4% vs. 37.3%), while the opposite goes for store B (38.7 vs. 48.9). This
difference is due to the combination of two factors: first, wealthier families buy larger
bundles (and preference for store A is stronger for larger bundles); second, wealthier
families are located relatively closer to store A.
Differences across households grouped by family size and age groups are mainly
driven by travel costs. With a few exceptions from the removal of stores C, E and G,
welfare losses are higher for larger families; similarly, young households have a lower
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welfare loss under all the counterfactuals relative to adult and senior households.
While families with children have generally lower travel costs, relative welfare effects
differ significantly depending on the store removed, because of location and shopping
habits. Families with children, married couples, households of higher income and with
higher education suffer relatively more from the removal of store A and relatively
less from the removal of stores F and G; these differences are driven by the relative
shopping habits of these groups, rather than their travel costs.
Replacement of store B to a new location produces significantly lower welfare
losses than its removal. The overall welfare loss from its replacement to a new less
convenient location is 26.9% versus the 44.4% loss from its removal. The distribution
of these losses across households however, does not match that of the removal of the
store. Changes in the ranks of losses are due to the distribution of household location
and on how the additional (or reduced) distance differently affects the households.
Tables 1.6 and 1.7 report observed and predicted expenditures and trips, both
before and after the removal of one of the stores. The first two rows of both tables
report respectively the actual and predicted measures. Although the logit specifi-
cation matches choice probabilities, and not expenditures, predicted expenditures in
the baseline match pretty closely observed expenditure in the data; as expected, the
match is extremely precise for trips.
Rows indexed A through G report counterfactual trips and expenditures predicted
after removal of the corresponding store. Note that the IIA property here holds only
at the household level and for a given bundle, as both planned bundle size and location
affect a consumer’s decision. Reading the numbers along the columns highlights the
gains for each store from the removal of one of the competitors. Store A benefits more
from the removal of store C than B, and has a very small benefit from the removal of
the other stores. Store B benefits almost equally from the removal of stores A and C
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in terms of trips, but the increased expenditure from people substituting away from
store A is much larger. For stores D through G the removal of store B is way more
beneficial than that of store A.
These results appear even more clear in tables 1.8 and 1.9. Table 1.8 reports the
change in the share of trips under the different counterfactuals. Reading along a row
will express how the trips originally made to one store are substituted to other stores;
reading along a column expresses how the removal of a competitor affects a particular
store. Similarly, table 1.9 reports effects on the overall revenue shares.
Table 1.10 summarizes for the effect of the replacement of store B to a new lo-
cation. The replacement of a store has more subtle effects then its simple removal:
not only will the original location affect how people substitute away from the store,
but also the new location will affect people substituting to the store from different
locations. Again, both location and bundle size contribute to the results in table
1.10. Looking at the change in the share of trips, we see that stores C and D have the
highest gains followed by store A, store B looses a big portion of its original share,
and all other stores have a substantial gain. The effect on expenditures share however
is (not) surprisingly different; store C, who had the highest increase in trips, gains
less than stores A and D.
I finally compare the welfare measures and the counterfactual visits and expendi-
tures reported above for the full model with heterogeneous consumer travel costs, to
those implied by a simpler model with homogeneous consumers and no control for the
size of the bundle. The comparison helps to better understand how the inclusion of
heterogeneity, and controlling for bundle size, both yield a significantly richer welfare
analysis and provide more realistic substitution patterns.
Tables 1.11 compares the welfare impacts under the two counterfactuals using the
estimates of models (1) and (3) from table 1.3. Looking at the overall impact, we find
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that the welfare losses implied by model (1) are significantly lower than those implied
by model (3). The difference is presumably due to linear specification of travel costs
in model (1), ignoring the decreasing nature of marginal travel costs, and the omission
of a control for the bundle size, that in the larger model allows consumers to “select”
to a more suitable store depending on their planned bundle.
Table 1.11 also looks at welfare differentials between the two models across income
classes and family size. Not surprisingly, differentials implied by model (2) are signif-
icantly smaller in most cases. For example, the welfare loss from the removal of store
A ranges from -35.7% to -46.5% for model (1) and from -37.3% to -51.4% for model
(3); as the estimates from latter model suggest travel costs which are decreasing in
income (that alone would imply a smaller gap), the wider gap in the welfare losses is
entirely due to the inclusion of the control for bundle size. Conversely, when we look
at family size, it is the inclusion of heterogeneity that leads to the larger gap in model
(3) predictions. For example, the welfare loss from the removal of store A increases in
family size from -38.1% to -41.9% for model (1) and from -36.6% to -51.7% for model
(3); this is because not only larger families do buy larger bundles, but also experience
higher travel costs according to model (3) estimates.
Table 1.12 looks instead at the fit of the two models and their implied substitution
patterns. Both models are very accurate in matching the number of trips observed
in the data, but produce significantly different predictions for expenditure shares. In
particular, model (1) does a very bad job at matching expenditures at store A, as
the model cannot explain why people buying larger bundles select to that store from
longer distances. The second part of table 1.12 reports the “normalized” change in the
share to make possible comparisons between the two models. Substitution patterns
appear significantly different between the two specifications; for example, both models
suggest that after the removal of store A, 72% of expenditure at that store would be
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substituted to stores B and C, but the two models disagree in how this expenditure
will be substituted to the two stores. As model (1) ignores the heterogeneity in
consumer travel costs and shopping habits, the richer specification of model (3) is
able to capture more features of the market and should thus be preferred as long as
these features produce significantly different substitution patterns.
1.8 Conclusions
Policy oriented empirical analysis of retail markets requires understanding how
travel costs affect consumers’ decisions. Empirical challenges in the context of super-
market choice make the use of standard techniques infeasible or require restrictive
assumptions on bundle choice. This paper examines two alternative methodologies
that allow to abstract from bundle choice, and develops a multinomial logit specifi-
cation that allows for a flexible model of consumers’ heterogeneity in travel costs.
Adding to the existing literature on spatial competition, variation in demand and
substitution patterns across stores are explained not only by differences in store char-
acteristics and the geographic distribution of consumers, but also by the shopping
habits and relative geographic distribution of household demographic types. Using
micro level data on store and household locations, consumers’ heterogeneity in travel
costs is directly identified as a function of observable consumer characteristics. By
specifying utility as a function of both store and bundle characteristics, I control for
the endogeneity of expenditure on the bundle, and this flexible specification can be
generalized to address additional selection biases arising in markets with less homo-
geneous competitors.
Consistently with Davis (2006) I find that travel costs are quadratic and marginally
decreasing. Both the quadratic term and heterogeneity parameters are robust to a
48
variety of model specifications. Identification however, comes from the observed dif-
ferences in behavior across geographically dispersed household types, rather than from
the differential effect on demand of the nearby population. Store fixed effects reflect
how consumers value both the location and the attributes of a store. Households are
sensitive to price in proportion to their anticipated bundle. However, they seem to
substitute between stores across different shopping occasions, and show a strong taste
for variety and assortment, as they tend to shop at larger stores for larger bundles.
The model is suitable for a wide range of policy experiments, and allows to assess
the welfare effects of a change in the choice set across different groups of consumers.
The model can also be applied to the study of local competition and store location
decisions, as it allows to study the effect on store revenues and customer visits un-
der realistic substitution patterns. The two counterfactual experiments conducted
exemplify a large number of questions that can be answered within this framework.
Supply side considerations could be added to the model in the study of larger mar-
kets. Higher variation in store characteristics allows estimation of price elasticity of
demand at a store, leading to a better understanding of competition between (chain)
stores and of the effect of mergers in local spatially differentiated markets.
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Tables and Figures
Figure 1.1: Distribution of Households and Stores
Figure 1.2: Distribution of Driving Time
to a store (a), Number (b), Rank (c) and
Herfindahl Index (d) of Stores visited by
households in a year
Figure 1.3: Distribution of Trip (a) and
Weekly (b) Expenditures, Weekly Trips
(c) and Average bundle expenditure (d)
at stores by Income (low, medium, high)
50
Table 1.1: Pittsfield Sample Descriptive Statistics
Obs Median Mean S.d. Min Max
Weekly Trips 122,824 2 2.11 1.67 0 19
Weekly Expenditure 122,824 79.12 94.27 81.30 0 1268.73
Trip Expenditure 259,415 27.07 44.63 48.76 0.5 982.02
Distance (miles) 259,415 2.76 3.07 2.07 0 20.30
Driving (minutes) 259,415 7.88 8.59 4.55 0 41.55
Family Size* 2362 2 2.53 1.26 1 6
Income** 2362 40 48.78 31.19 5 125
Married 2362 1 0.63 0.48 0 1
Children 2362 0 0.26 0.44 0 1
Over 55 2362 1 0.51 0.5 0 1
Under 35 2362 0 0.05 0.21 0 1
Alone 2362 0 0.21 0.41 0 1
Notes: The table provides descriptive statistics for the larger sample of 2,362
households.
* Family Size takes value of 6 when there are 6 or more members in the family.
** Households report an income band they belong to; while bands are “tight”
for low income, the highest income band reports all households with an income
higher than 100,000 dollars. To compute the values reported here I use the mean
value of a band and 125 thousand dollars for the highest band.
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Table 1.2: Reduced Form Regressions
Dep. Variable
(Avg. Expenditure) (Avg. Trips)
Constant 34.323** 1.958**
(4.63) (0.19)
Income 0.120** -0.002
(0.02 ) 0
Family Size 4.966** 0.104**
(0.67 ) (0.03 )
Child 1.756 -0.333**
(1.84 ) (0.08 )
House 3.804* -0.144*
(1.6) (0.07 )
Married 3.166* 0.176**
(1.47) (0.06)
Over55 -4.472** 0.086
(1.62 ) (0.07 )
Under35 -5.651* -0.059
(2.77 ) (0.12 )
Edu 1 0.711 -0.098
(1.22 ) (0.05 )
Edu 2 11.097* -0.359
(4.47 ) (0.19 )
Work 1 6.015** -0.191**
(1.66 ) (0.07 )
Work 2 6.469** -0.266**
(1.69 ) (0.07 )
Work 3 -7.644 0.527
(7.54 ) (0.32 )
Location Index -11.340** 0.358**
(2.59 ) (0.11)
R-squared 0.2 0.05
N 2362
Notes: results from reduced form the reduced form regres-
sion of household average trip expenditure and number of
weekly trips on consumer demographics and a Location
Index. Income and Family Size are numerical variables.
The other demographic variables are dummies that take
value of 1 if a household belongs to the specific class. Edu
refers to a households education (0=low, 1=high, 2=un-
kown); Work refers to a household’s workload (0=low, 1-
med, 2=high, 3=unknown). The Location index used is
Lh =
P
s 1/rsd
−1/2
s and denotes a household’s proximity
to supermarkets, a higher value indicating a better loca-
tion.
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Table 1.3: Estimation Results: Multinomial Logit Models (1)-(5)
model (1) (2) (3) (4)a (5)
b1 -0.002 (0.000) -0.002 (0.000) -0.002 (0.000) -0.002 (0.000) -0.001 (0.000)
b2 -0.003 (0.000) -0.003 (0.000) -0.003 (0.000) -0.003 (0.000) -0.002 (0.000)
b3 -0.002 (0.000) -0.002 (0.000) -0.002 (0.000) -0.002 (0.000) -0.002 (0.000)
b4 -0.002 (0.000) -0.002 (0.000) -0.002 (0.000) -0.002 (0.000) -0.002 (0.000)
ξA 1.050 (0.025) 1.399 (0.026) 1.274 (0.026) 1.282 (0.040) -2.371 (0.028)
ξB 0.480 (0.024) 0.774 (0.025) 0.737 (0.025) 0.748 (0.039) -2.409 (0.026)
ξC 0.529 (0.024) 0.850 (0.025) 1.011 (0.025) 1.022 (0.039) -2.193 (0.026)
ξD 0.240 (0.025) 0.574 (0.026) 0.549 (0.026) 0.559 (0.043) -2.403 (0.027)
ξE -0.446 (0.026) -0.118 (0.027) 0.089 (0.027) 0.099 (0.047) -2.437 (0.028)
ξF -0.755 (0.025) -0.497 (0.025) -0.272 (0.025) -0.261 (0.043) -2.620 (0.026)
ξG -1.001 (0.025) -0.742 (0.025) -0.540 (0.025) -0.528 (0.046) -2.750 (0.026)
γ0 (d) -0.091 (0.000) -0.119 (0.001) -0.117 (0.001) -0.117 (0.001) -0.041 (0.001)
γ1 (d2) 0.001 (0.000) 0.001 (0.000) 0.001 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000)
γY -0.064 (0.007) -0.062 (0.007) -0.062 (0.007) -0.047 (0.008)
γFS -0.006 (0.000) -0.006 (0.000) -0.009 (0.001) -0.004 (0.000)
γCH1 0.009 (0.001) 0.009 (0.001) 0.009 (0.001) 0.003 (0.001)
γCH2 0.009 (0.001) 0.010 (0.001) 0.010 (0.001) 0.004 (0.001)
γAGE1 0.014 (0.001) 0.014 (0.001) 0.014 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001)
γAGE2 -0.006 (0.001) -0.006 (0.001) -0.006 (0.001) -0.002 (0.001)
γWR1 0.003 (0.001) 0.002 (0.001) 0.002 (0.001) 0.003 (0.001)
γWR2 0.004 (0.001) 0.003 (0.001) 0.003 (0.001) 0.004 (0.001)
γWR3 -0.013 (0.003) -0.012 (0.003) -0.012 (0.003) -0.020 (0.003)
γEDU1 -0.001 (0.001) -0.001 (0.001) -0.001 (0.001) -0.000 (0.001)
γEDU2 -0.000 (0.002) -0.002 (0.002) -0.002 (0.002) 0.004 (0.002)
γMRD1 0.005 (0.001) 0.005 (0.001) 0.005 (0.001) 0.003 (0.001)
βq(×1000) 0.150 (0.002) 0.150 (0.002) 0.158 (0.002)
α 0.005 (0.000) 0.004 (0.000) -0.004 (0.000) -0.004 (0.000) -0.005 (0.000)
Experience 2.930 (0.008)
Loglikelihood -454974 -452932 -450453 -449,741 -349509
N 274254
store G to A (minutes)b 23.6 18.8 19.5 19.5 -
Notes: MNL models (1)-(5). γs are the driving time parameters, interacted with the inverse of Income (γY ),
family size (γFS) and a set of demographic dummies. CH1 denotes having one young child, CH2 having two or
more children. ξs denote store fixed effects. βq interacts real quantity of the bundle with size of a store; coefficient
and standard error are multiplied by 1000. b1−4 reflect the effect of normalized previous weeks purchases on utility
from the outside option. Experience is the parameter on a dummy taking value of 1 if a households has visited
the store at least 10 times. α is the coefficient on expenditure.
a In model (8) store effects are time varying. Mean Values are reported here.
b “store G to A” is the average additional time a person would drive to visit store A rather than store G. When a
quadratic term is included the value is reported using store G as a starting location (moving away from it would
decrease the measure).
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Table 1.4: Estimation Results: Moment Inequalities
lb. ub.
α -1 - -1 -
γ -1.85 (-1.87) –1.75 (-1.74)
ξA 0 - 0 -
ξB -25.56 (-25.64) –8.60 (-8.52)
ξC -13.70 (-13.73) –13.08 (-13.04)
ξD -7.39 (-7.44) 7.06 (7.11)
ξE -9.80 (-9.86) 4.64 (4.69)
ξF -29.07 (-29.24) –19.27 (-19.14)
ξG -34.35 (-34.53) –13.87 (-13.72)
Avg. n 142,873
store G to A (minutes)a 19 8
Notes: Estimation results from the Inequality model. I construct
moments by comparing to each store all alternative stores, for a
total of 7-by-6, 42 moments. γ is the travel cost parameter. ξs
denote store fixed effects. Disutility from expenditure, α, is nor-
malized to -1. Avg. n denotes the average number of observations
per moment.
a “store G to A” (= (ξA − ξG)/γ) is the implied additional time a
person would drive to visit store A rather than store G.
54
Table 1.5: Welfare Change from (a) Store Removal and (b) Replacement
Counterfactual: (a) (b)
store removed/replaced A B C D E F G B-B’
Income
low -37.3 -48.9 -40.3 -12.1 -7.2 -13.3 -9.5 -35.0
medium -43.8 -44.7 -40.3 -14.2 -8.0 -12.7 -8.3 -27.1
high -51.4 -38.7 -40.3 -14.6 -7.8 -11.9 -6.3 -17.6
Family Size
1 -36.6 -42.7 -38.3 -12.1 -7.1 -12.5 -7.9 -27.7
2 -43.0 -43.3 -41.4 -13.5 -7.8 -13.0 -8.2 -26.9
3 -45.5 -44.9 -40.3 -14.5 -7.8 -12.3 -8.2 -26.1
>3 -51.7 -47.9 -40.2 -15.2 -8.0 -12.5 -8.4 -26.9
Children
no children -43.8 -46.9 -42.4 -14.2 -8.2 -13.6 -8.8 -29.6
1 child -40.5 -37.2 -32.8 -12.0 -6.1 -9.8 -6.0 -21.1
more than 1 child -56.3 -38.6 -40.9 -13.2 -7.1 -10.9 -7.4 -14.1
Age
adult -43.7 -41.0 -36.2 -12.7 -6.6 -11.0 -7.2 -22.8
young -30.2 -28.3 -26.6 -9.9 -4.9 -8.3 -5.4 -16.5
senior -45.9 -49.7 -45.9 -15.2 -9.0 -14.8 -9.4 -32.2
Work
low -43.1 -49.4 -45.6 -14.2 -8.5 -14.6 -10.3 -33.4
medium -46.4 -45.3 -38.2 -15.2 -8.2 -12.4 -7.1 -26.0
high -42.3 -38.7 -36.5 -12.1 -6.4 -10.8 -6.7 -21.5
Education
low -39.7 -44.8 -39.3 -12.5 -7.0 -12.1 -8.8 -29.5
high -48.6 -43.7 -41.1 -15.3 -8.5 -13.4 -7.1 -23.9
Married
not married -37.4 -46.1 -38.4 -12.6 -7.2 -12.9 -8.9 -31.3
married -47.7 -43.4 -41.4 -14.4 -8.0 -12.5 -7.7 -24.4
Overall -43.9 -44.4 -40.3 -13.7 -7.7 -12.7 -8.2 -26.9
Notes: Summary table of the welfare changes from (a) store removal and (b) replacement. The
welfare change is measured as the percentage change in expected consumer surplus. Columns A
through G report the effect of the removal of the respective store. Column B-B’ the effect of the
re-location of store B to a new location. Measures are reported for the overall population and for
demographic groups.
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Table 1.6: Expenditures
A B C D E F G
Expenditures
Actual 3,882,571 2,895,632 2,606,166 1,150,249 545,196 405,906 533,707
Model 3,774,935 3,135,673 2,355,431 1,053,234 504,803 734,383 460,945
Counterfactuals
A 0 4,138,630 3,666,426 1,389,507 651,077 978,652 594,977
B 4,769,574 0 3,015,069 1,534,446 717,272 1,023,389 669,636
C 4,887,552 3,742,639 0 1,248,218 606,098 913,454 567,639
D 4,048,936 3,503,647 2,530,655 0 585,752 812,856 503,828
E 3,884,236 3,279,722 2,435,344 1,121,004 0 772,713 480,051
F 3,972,293 3,356,660 2,508,124 1,128,919 547,215 0 494,993
G 3,893,646 3,301,146 2,452,067 1,097,917 527,292 770,874 0
Notes: The table reports observed (actual) expenditure and model predicted expenditure at stores A through G
in the first two rows. Rows labeled A through G report counterfactual predicted expenditures after the removal
of the respective store.
Table 1.7: Trips
A B C D E F G Total
Trips
Actual 63,649 64,672 60,537 22,643 13,052 21,157 13,705 259,415
Model 63,648 64,671 60,536 22,643 13,052 21,157 13,704 259,411
Counterfactuals
A 0 80,103 86,763 28,116 16,088 26,816 16,929 254,816
B 79,542 0 76,784 32,312 18,273 29,062 19,593 255,566
C 88,037 79,744 0 27,693 16,081 27,127 17,361 256,043
D 68,128 71,883 64,889 0 15,049 23,308 14,928 258,184
E 66,063 68,389 63,030 24,479 0 22,459 14,375 258,795
F 68,241 70,627 65,522 24,758 14,405 0 14,940 258,493
G 66,299 68,963 63,537 23,845 13,742 22,390 0 258,776
Notes: The table reports observed (actual) visits and model predicted visits at stores A through G in the
first two rows. Rows labeled A through G report counterfactual predicted visits after the removal of the
respective store.
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Table 1.8: Change in trips share
A B C D E F G
Trips Share
actual 24.5 24.9 23.3 8.7 5.0 8.2 5.3
model 24.5 24.9 23.3 8.7 5.0 8.2 5.3
∆ in Trips Share
A -24.5 6.5 10.7 2.3 1.3 2.4 1.4
B 6.6 -24.9 6.7 3.9 2.1 3.2 2.4
C 9.8 6.2 -23.3 2.1 1.2 2.4 1.5
D 1.9 2.9 1.8 -8.7 0.8 0.9 0.5
E 1.0 1.5 1.0 0.7 -5.0 0.5 0.3
F 1.9 2.4 2.0 0.8 0.5 -8.2 0.5
G 1.1 1.7 1.2 0.5 0.3 0.5 -5.3
Notes: The table reports the change in the share of visits under the different
counterfactuals. Observed (actual) shares and model predicted shares by stores A
through G are reported in the first two rows. Rows A through G under counter-
factuals denote the store that is being removed. Reading along a row will express
how a store’s share is substituted to other stores; reading along a column expresses
how the removal of a competitor affects the share of a particular store.
Table 1.9: Change in Expenditures Share
A B C D E F G
Expenditure Share
actual 32.3 24.1 21.7 9.6 4.5 3.4 4.4
model 31.4 26.1 19.6 8.8 4.2 6.1 3.8
∆ in Expenditure Share
A -31.4 10.2 12.5 3.4 1.5 2.5 1.4
B 9.3 -26.1 6.1 4.3 1.9 2.6 1.9
C 9.4 5.2 -19.6 1.7 0.9 1.5 0.9
D 2.4 3.1 1.5 -8.8 0.7 0.7 0.4
E 1.0 1.3 0.7 0.6 -4.2 0.3 0.2
F 1.7 1.9 1.3 0.6 0.4 -6.1 0.3
G 0.9 1.3 0.8 0.4 0.2 0.3 -3.8
Notes: The table reports the change in the revenue share of stores under different coun-
terfactuals. Observed (actual) shares and model predicted shares by stores A through
G are reported in the first two rows. Rows A through G under counterfactuals denote
the store that is being removed. Reading along a row will express how a store’s revenue
share is substituted to other stores; reading along a column expresses how the removal of
a competitor affects the share of a particular store.
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Table 1.10: Store B re-placement: Trips, Expenditures and Shares
A B(B’) C D E F G
Trips∗
Actual 636 647 605 226 131 212 137
Model 636 647 605 226 131 212 137
Counterfactual 693 272 685 301 170 270 183
Expenditures∗∗
Actual 3883 2896 2606 1150 545 406 534
Model 3775 3136 2355 1053 505 734 461
Counterfactual 4084 1484 2654 1413 663 943 619
Share
of Trips
Actual 24.5 24.9 23.3 8.7 5.0 8.2 5.3
Model 24.5 24.9 23.3 8.7 5.0 8.2 5.3
Counterfactual 26.9 10.6 26.6 11.7 6.6 10.5 7.1
Change 2.4 -14.4 3.3 2.9 1.6 2.3 1.8
Share
of Expenditure
Actual 32.3 24.1 21.7 9.6 4.5 3.4 4.4
Model 31.4 26.1 19.6 8.8 4.2 6.1 3.8
Counterfactual 34.4 12.5 22.4 11.9 5.6 8.0 5.2
Change 3.0 -13.6 2.8 3.2 1.4 1.8 1.4
Notes: summary table of the effect on visits and expenditures at stores after the replace-
ment of store B to a new location. Values are reported for actual, model and counterfactual
number of trips, expenditure, share of trips and revenue shares at stores A through G.
Change in the share of trips and revenues are also reported.
* Trips in hundreds of trips.
** Expenditures in thousands of dollars.
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Table 1.11: Model Comparison: Welfare Change from store removal
A B C D E F G B-B’
1. Overall
Model (1) -40.8 -41.1 -37.3 -12.9 -7.2 -11.8 -7.6 -25.4
Model (3) -43.9 -44.4 -40.3 -13.7 -7.7 -12.7 -8.2 -26.9
2. By Income
low -35.7 -42.2 -34.3 -11.5 -6.3 -11.2 -7.9 -29.5
Model (1) medium -41.1 -42.4 -37.9 -13.4 -7.5 -12.0 -7.9 -26.6
high -46.5 -37.1 -39.9 -13.4 -7.6 -11.9 -6.5 -18.0
low -37.3 -48.9 -40.3 -12.1 -7.2 -13.3 -9.5 -35.0
Model (3) medium -43.8 -44.7 -40.3 -14.2 -8.0 -12.7 -8.3 -27.1
high -51.4 -38.7 -40.3 -14.6 -7.8 -11.9 -6.3 -17.6
3. By Family Size
1.0 -38.1 -41.9 -35.7 -12.2 -6.7 -11.6 -7.5 -27.5
Model (1) 2.0 -41.4 -41.4 -38.1 -12.9 -7.3 -12.1 -7.7 -26.4
3.0 -41.1 -41.1 -38.0 -13.5 -7.3 -11.7 -7.7 -24.3
>3 -41.9 -39.8 -36.7 -13.0 -7.2 -11.3 -7.3 -22.6
1.0 -36.6 -42.7 -38.3 -12.1 -7.1 -12.5 -7.9 -27.7
Model (3) 2.0 -43.0 -43.3 -41.4 -13.5 -7.8 -13.0 -8.2 -26.9
3.0 -45.5 -44.9 -40.3 -14.5 -7.8 -12.3 -8.2 -26.1
>3 -51.7 -47.9 -40.2 -15.2 -8.0 -12.5 -8.4 -26.9
Notes: Model comparison table, comparing the welfare changes from store removal
and replacement using the estimates of MNL specifications (1) and (3) from table 5.
Model (1) assumes homogeneous linear travel costs, model (3) assumes heterogeneous
consumer travel costs and includes a quadratic term in the disutility from driving time
as well as a control for the bundle size (i.e. βq).ps. The welfare change is measured as
the percentage change in expected consumer surplus.
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Table 1.12: Model Comparison: Model’s Fit and Substitution Patterns
A B C D E F G
Trip Shares
Actual 24.5 24.9 23.3 8.7 5.0 8.2 5.3
Model (1) 24.5 24.9 23.3 8.7 5.0 8.2 5.3
Model (3) 24.5 24.9 23.3 8.7 5.0 8.2 5.3
Expenditure Shares
Actual 32.3 24.1 21.7 9.6 4.5 3.4 4.4
Model (1) 27.1 24.5 22.8 8.2 5.1 7.6 4.6
Model (3) 31.4 26.1 19.6 8.8 4.2 6.1 3.8
∆ Expenditure Sharesa
Model (1)
A -1 0.27 0.45 0.08 0.05 0.10 0.05
B 0.28 -1 0.27 0.15 0.09 0.12 0.08
C 0.46 0.26 -1 0.08 0.05 0.09 0.05
D 0.21 0.35 0.20 -1 0.10 0.10 0.05
E 0.21 0.31 0.19 0.14 -1 0.10 0.05
F 0.26 0.29 0.23 0.10 0.07 -1 0.05
G 0.23 0.33 0.22 0.09 0.05 0.09 -1
Model (3)
A -1 0.32 0.40 0.11 0.05 0.08 0.04
B 0.35 -1 0.23 0.17 0.07 0.10 0.07
C 0.48 0.26 -1 0.09 0.04 0.08 0.05
D 0.27 0.36 0.17 -1 0.08 0.08 0.04
E 0.25 0.31 0.18 0.14 -1 0.08 0.04
F 0.27 0.31 0.21 0.10 0.06 -1 0.05
G 0.24 0.34 0.20 0.09 0.05 0.08 -1
Notes: Model comparison table, comparing MNL specifications (1) and (3) from table
5 in terms the fit of trip and expenditure shares at different stores, and substitution
patterns in expenditure shares under counterfactual store removal. Model (1) assumes
homogeneous linear travel costs, model (3) assumes heterogeneous consumer travel costs
and includes a quadratic term in the disutility from driving time as well as a control
for the bundle size (i.e. βq).ps. Rows labeling A through G refers to the removal of the
respective store.
a The change in expenditure share, ∆ Expenditure Sharesa, has been normalized to
allow comparison between the two models. Normalization was done by dividing the
percentage change in expenditure share at a store by the model’s predicted share at the
store being removed.
60
Chapter 2
Retail Pricing with Attractor
Goods
2.1 Introduction
When going on a shopping trip, consumers are most often interested in buying
a specific subset of goods and specific needs will likely guide their decision. More-
over, once in a store, consumers often end up buying substitute and complementary
products, or even additional products which were not used to formulate their store
choice. The assumption of rationality in retail shopping decisions appears very prob-
lematic when stores sell thousands of products and frequently vary their assortments
and prices. Consumers are typically uncertain about prices at different stores and
for a consumer to consider the entire distribution of bundles and prices might be a
far too complex decision process. Furthermore, models with rational consumers are
incapable of fully explaining important features of retail markets such as price dis-
persion, advertising and leader pricing. Conversely, acknowledging the limited ability
of consumers to make such complicated decisions might improve our understanding
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of retail pricing and competition.
In this paper I attempt to characterize optimal pricing by multi-product retailers
when imperfectly informed consumers buy more than one product. The distinctive
feature of the model is that there are two relevant moments to all purchase decisions.
First, the choice to go on a shopping trip and of the store to visit, and second, the
choice of the items to purchase. These two moments are separated in time, and while
consumers might rationally choose a store to best meet their specific needs and desires,
the choice of the items to purchase is made only once in a store. Whether guided
by impulse, contingent and unforeseen needs or in-store learning about a product,
consumers often end up buying additional products which can generate higher profits
for the stores. In this sense consumers are not fully rational, because they do not
anticipate the surplus they will get from buying additional products.
To examine the implications on retail pricing of this kind of behavior, I depart from
a standard rational setup and introduce the concept of attractor goods. Using an an
approach similar to that found in Osborne and Rubinstein (1998) and Spiegler (2006)
I consider boundedly rational consumers whose choice between stores is based solely
and entirely on the price and valuation of a subset of goods, the attractors, while the
decision about what goods to purchase is made only once a consumer is in the store
and is driven by a standard willingness to pay approach. The notion of attractor
good captures perhaps several concepts found in the literature. For example, Hess
and Gerstner (1987) use the notion of shopping good (as opposed to impulse goods)
to address the retailing strategy of Loss Leader Pricing : people visit a store to buy
the shopping good and end up buying also impulse goods.1
1Hess and Gerstner though, and most of the literature on Loss Leader Pricing, fail to recognize
why a particular good is a leader in the first place, focusing only on whether a profit maximizing firm
will price that good below marginal cost. The notion of attractor good generalizes that of shopping
good in that consumers are heterogeneous in what good(s) attract them, and the distinction between
goods is continuous rather than dichotomous (leader/non leader).
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I build a three-stage game in which stores sells K products to a continuum of
consumers with heterogeneous tastes over goods. Each consumer makes her decision
whether to go on a shopping trip based only on the price of an attractor which
assigned by nature according to a distribution that is known to the stores. Once in
a store a consumer will purchase all the items for which her valuation is higher than
the price. As spatial differentiation in traditional retail markets implies that stores
possess some degree of market power in the presence of consumers travel cost, I first
consider the optimal pricing by a multi-product monopolist. The monopoly case can
be a useful benchmark to assess the implications for retail margins and profits even
in competitive markets. I then extend the framework to the case of two duopolists at
the endpoints of a segment competing over consumers with linear travel costs.
The notion of attractor goods improves on the existing literature in that it shows
a pattern of prices that cannot be explained only in terms of price elasticities and
positioning. By giving up a fully rational consumer, using the notion of attractor
goods, I am able to characterize a very important aspect of retail pricing: a good’s
price exerts a market size externality on the rest of the goods (by enlarging the pool
of customers), and the relative strength of such externality depends on the relative
attractiveness of a good; stores are typically more informed (on aggregate) about
consumer tastes and needs and their pricing strategies must take into account such
externality to be optimal. The optimal pricing schedule will be a decreasing function
of the goods’ attractiveness, and pricing below marginal cost might be optimal for
some goods. The model provides a rationale for the strategy of loss leader pricing
and offers an intuitive explanation to countercyclical markups.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2.2 I discuss some
of the existing literature. In section 2.3 I describe the model. In section 2.4 I discuss
the results in connection with empirical evidence found in the literature. In section
63
2.5 I conclude.
2.2 Background
Modeling multi-product stores and store choice by consumers is essential to the
analysis of retail competition and pricing strategies. Not surprisingly, a large number
of papers in the fields of Marketing and Industrial Organization have focused their
attention to the analysis of pricing decisions by multi-product stores. Unfortunately
though, analyzing market equilibrium and price competition with multi-product firms
is intrinsically difficult,2 and no unified treatment of market equilibrium exists in
such an environment. Researchers have instead used distinct approaches to analyze
different features of retail pricing.
As Varian (1980) clearly stated in an early paper, economists have long recognized
that “the law of one price is no law at all.” Retail stores compete along multiple di-
mensions, including price, quality, services and location, and enact a large number of
strategies to increase their profitability. The theoretical prediction that all transac-
tions will take place at marginal cost rested on the underlying assumptions of identical
firms, perfect information and no travel costs, and economist have tried to explain
the conflicting empirical evidence by relaxing these assumptions.
Large part of the literature on sales and price dispersion has focused on imperfect
information on prices. Varian (1980), for example, shows that in the presence of
search costs firms might use sales to discriminate between informed and uninformed
consumers. Sobel (1984) however, notes that sales are sometimes so “traditional and
2As Anderson and De Palma (2006) point out, “to characterize profit-maximizing prices for a
firm selling m products requires simultaneously solving m first-order conditions, [...] (and) to find
the profit-maximizing product range for a firm necessitates finding not only the direct effect on profit
from an additional product, but also the equilibrium pricing response of all other firms for all other
products.”
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well publicized” that it is unlikely for them to occur in order to discriminate between
informed and uninformed consumers. The author instead suggests that sales might
occur to inter-temporally discriminate between high and low value customers. In their
rationalization of loss leader pricing, the strategy of setting a price below marginal
cost to increase store traffic and earn higher profits on other goods, Lal and Matutes
(1994) show that in the presence of travel costs, if consumers are uninformed about
the firms’ prices unless advertised, firms might advertise loss leaders to compete for
store traffic. As the authors suggest, the result holds even when consumers are allowed
to visit more than one store and when consumers correctly anticipate higher prices
on the other goods.
While numerous papers have shown how imperfect information, product differenti-
ation, travel costs and search costs can help explain many of the strategies practiced
by retailers in the presence of rational consumers, their results often have limited
scope in their application, and are incapable of fully explaining important features
of retail markets such as price dispersion and leader pricing. For example, Baye
and Morgan (2004) note that price dispersion for identical products occurs even on
internet price-search engines, where it is implausible for high search costs to exist.
Similarly, low markups and loss leader pricing sometimes occur even on the regular
price of a product and without extensive advertisement, making implausible the as-
sumption that consumers are uninformed unless advertised. Furthermore, Weinstein
and Ambrus (2006) show that loss leader pricing cannot occur with rational informed
consumers even if they are constrained to purchase from a single store.
Unease with the assumption of consumer rationality has led many researchers to
explore alternative explanations to retail strategies, often specifying simple rules for
consumer behavior. Examples closely related to the current work include Feichtinger,
Luhmer, and Sorger (1988), who argue that consumers’ store choice is governed by
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aggregate information on price levels without much stress on comparison and choice,
or Hess and Gerstner (1987), who explain loss leader pricing by distinguishing between
impulse goods, goods bought on sight without price comparison across stores, and
shopping goods, those used to determine which store to visit. Furthermore, as Ellison
(2006) points out, even papers will fully rational agents could be easily revisited as
an instance of bounded rationality.3
The notion of attractor goods in retail shopping decisions introduces a form of
bounded rationality very similar to that found in Spiegler (2006) and Osborne and
Rubinstein (1998). Spiegler (2006) considers markets in which products have multiple
dimensions (a bank account, an insurance policy, ecc.), and firms set a price along
each of these dimensions. Consumers, who are limited in their ability to understand
such complicated pricing schemes use a sampling procedure to choose a product:
they randomly pick one dimension and choose according to the firms’ prices along
that dimension. Firms on the other hand are rational, and randomize their prices
to make their product really attractive along certain dimensions and more profitable
in others. The sampling procedure was first developed in Osborne and Rubinstein
(1998) who introduced a class of games with procedurally rational agents.
2.3 The model
Consider a three-stage game in which stores sells K products to a continuum of
consumers with heterogeneous tastes over goods. At the beginning of the game, each
consumer is assigned by nature with an attractor, and her decision whether to visit a
store, and eventually which store to visit, will rely solely and entirely on the price and
3For example, Ellison (2006) notes that the high search cost consumers who choose at random
in Varian (1980), or the infinitely impatient consumers in Sobel (1984), could be cast as boundedly
rational consumers, and that for both papers sales could be interpreted as an attempt to price
discriminate between more and less sophisticated consumers.
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valuation of the attractor. Once in a store a consumer observes the prices and learns
her valuations for the remaining products, and purchases all products for which her
willingness to pay is higher than the price.
The peculiar assumption that consumers decision to go on a shopping trip only
involves the price and valuation for the attractor is grounded on a few considerations.
Stores sell a very large number of products, and consumers are typically imperfectly
informed about both products and prices. While it is plausible that consumers ratio-
nally anticipate prices, or otherwise form expectations on the potential surplus from a
shopping trip, these prices are totally uninformative when consumers are unaware of
the existence of a product, or when the actual valuation for a product can be observed
only once in the store. Furthermore, consumers shopping decisions are often guided
by specific needs and desires. By assuming perfect information on the attractor’s
value and price, the attractor can be interpreted as the set of goods the consumer is
both aware of and plans to buy (with respect to which he is indeed rational). The ac-
tual purchase decisions, however, are made only once in a store, and, whether guided
by impulse, unforeseen needs or in-store learning about a product, consumers often
end up buying more than originally planned.
In the following section I first introduce the case of a monopolist facing a mass
one of heterogeneous consumers. As in the presence of consumers travel cost and
spatial differentiation retail stores possess some degree of market power, a model of
monopoly can be a useful benchmark to assess the implications for retail margins and
profits even in competitive markets. In this case, the choice of a consumer in the
second stage reduces to the choice between visiting or not visiting the store. I then
extend the framework to the case of two competing duopolist at the endpoints of a
segment.
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2.3.1 The Monopolist Case
Assume that a Monopolist sells K products, and that the marginal cost is equal
zero for all the goods. Further assume that consumers’ preferences are identically and
independently distributed across goods, and their willingness to pay are a draw from
the uniform (0,1). The setup of the game is the following. In stage 0, nature assigns
to each consumer a vector of valuations v = (v1, ..., vK), were vk ∼ U(0, 1) for k =
1, .., K, and an attractor j ∈ {1, 2, ..., K} according to a distribution f(j) = qj. The
distribution f(·) is known to the monopolist. In stage 1 the monopolist sets the prices
to maximize expected profits given f(·). In stage 2 consumers learn their attractor j,
their valuation for it vj, and its price pj, and decide to go on a shopping trip whenever
vj ≥ pj. In stage 3 consumers who visit the store make their consumption decision in
order to maximize their surplus: they will purchase any product k for which vk ≥ pk.
Consider a consumer who’s attractor is good j; since her valuation vj is a draw
from a uniform (0,1), the probability she will visit the store is equal to
P (vj ≥ pj) =

0 for pj > 1
1− pj for 0 ≤ pj ≤ 1
1 otherwise
Similarly, once in the store, the consumer will buy good l 6= j with probability 1− pl
when 0 ≤ pl ≤ 1, and, respectively, with probability 1 or 0 for pl smaller than 0 or
greater than 1.
In my setup, the lower bound for the willingness to pay coincides with the marginal
cost and is set equal to zero; this makes it trivial to show that setting a negative price
is never convenient for the monopolist, as setting a negative price has no beneficial
68
effect on the number of consumers who visit the store4. Moreover, for any price
pj ≥ 1, the demand for good j will be equal zero. Given these considerations, we can
restrict the domain of prices to the compact set [0, 1]K .
As the total mass of consumers is equal to 1, the mass of consumers for which
good j is the attractor is exactly equal to qj. Given that the relevant domain of prices
is the compact set [0, 1]K , I can express the profit function for the monopolist as a
weighted sum of revenues, over the distribution of attractors, from people who decide
to go to the store; formally,
Π(p) =
K∑
j=1
qj(1− pj) ·
(
pj +
∑
l 6=j
pl(1− pl)
)
. (2.1)
Note that Π is a continuous function in p ∈ RK , and thus attains a global maximum
in [0, 1]K , compact subset of RK .
For the characterization of the maximum we can start considering the K first order
conditions (FOCs) of the problem:
∂Π(p)
∂pj
≤ 0 and pj ∂Π(p)
∂pj
= 0 (2.2)
for j = 1, ..., K, where
∂Π(p)
∂pj
= (1− 2pj)
(
qj +
∑
l 6=j
ql(1− pl)
)
− qj
∑
l 6=j
pl(1− pl) (2.3)
The following propositions further restrict the relevant domain to the interval [0, 1/2]K .
Proposition 2.3.1. Assume 1 > qj > 0 for some j ∈ {1, .., K}. A monopolist selling
K goods will never set a price pj ≥ 1/2 for any p−j, where p−j denotes the price of
all other commodities.
4Note that this is not necessarily the case when there is more than one firm.
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Proof. For all values of p−j ≥ 0 the derivative of the profit function w.r.t. pj
∂Π(p)
∂pj
∣∣∣∣
pj≥1/2
= (1− 2pj)
(
qj +
∑
l 6=j
ql(1− pl)
)
− qj
∑
l 6=j
pl(1− pl) ≤ 0
since both the first and second term are smaller or equal to zero. Moreover, if for
some l 6= j, pl > 0 then the disequality is strict.
Now, consider the case where p = (pj, p−j) = (1/2, 0). Since 1 > qj > 0, there
exists k 6= j such that qk > 0; but
∂Π(p)
∂pk
∣∣∣∣
p
=
(
qk +
∑
l 6=j
ql(1− pl)
)
− qkpj(1− pj) > 0.
Proposition 2.3.2. A monopolist selling K goods will set a price pj = 1/2 whenever
qj = 0 for some j ∈ {1, .., K}.
Proof. Given qj = 0, for any p−j, pj = 1/2 is the only solution to the FOCs
∂Π(p)
∂pj
= (1− 2pj)
∑
l 6=j
ql(1− pl) = 0.
Propositions 2.3.1 and 2.3.2 restrict the domain of the profit maximizing price
vector to the [0, 1/2] interval. A price equal to 1/2 is the price that a single product
monopoly store would set; with attractor goods the multi-product monopolist has to
take into account the market size externality of setting a lower price; he will set price
equal to 1/2 only on those goods for which this externality is equal to zero, those
which never attract customers in the store. On the other hand, we cannot rule out
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that, setting a price equal to zero is optimal for some goods5; in fact the sign of the
derivative of Π at pj = 0 can be either positive or negative, depending on the weights
qi for i = 1, .., k:
∂Π(p)
∂pj
∣∣∣∣
pj=0
= qj
(
1−
∑
l 6=j
pl(1− pl)
)
+
∑
l 6=j
ql(1− pl).
For the solution to the FOCs to be a global maximum one possibility is to prove
is concavity of the profit function. A sufficient condition for concavity of Π is for the
Hessian of Π, HΠ, to be negative definite in (0, 1/2)
K . Unfortunately, as we will see,
the result is not necessarily true for K > 2.
Consider the second own and cross partial derivatives of Πi with respect to pi, pj.
We have that, for all i, j, and for all pi, pj ∈ (0, 1/2),
∂2Πi(p)
∂pi∂pi
= −2(qi +∑
l 6=i
ql(1− pl)
)
< −2(qi +∑
l 6=i
1
2
ql
)
< −1 (2.4)
∂2Πi(p)
∂pi∂pj
= −(qi(1− 2pj) + qj(1− 2pi)) > −(qi + qj > −1. (2.5)
By equations (2.4) and (2.5) we have that the diagonal elements of HΠ are strictly
greater than one in modulus, while the off diagonal elements are strictly smaller.
Proposition 2.3.3. For K = 2, the profit function Π(p) is concave in p in the
interval (0, 1/2)2 ⊂ R2.
Proof. For K = 2, as the diagonal elements are strictly greater than the off diagonal
elements, H11 < 0 and H11H22 −H212 > 0; therefore HΠ is negative definite, and Π is
concave.
5In the present setup a corner solution at which price for good j is set equal to zero implies that
pricing below marginal cost can be optimal when marginal cost is greater than zero.
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Unfortunately, matters get more complicated when K ≥ 3. Concavity of HΠ
would require that, for all x = (x1, x2, .., xK)
x′Hx ≤ 0
−2
∑
i
x2i
(
qi +
∑
l 6=i
ql(1− pl)
)− 2∑
i,j>i
xixj
(
qi(1− 2pj) + qj(1− 2pi)
) ≤ 0. (2.6)
While an explicit closed form solution the the FOCs cannot be found, and we are
not guaranteed that such a solution would imply a global maximum, I can characterize
an optimal pricing scheme in terms of the probabilities qjs. By proposition 2.3.4, the
optimal pricing schedule is a decreasing function of goods attractiveness. This is due
to the market size externality of setting a low price: the more attractive a good the
larger this externality and thus the lower the price. A useful corollary to proposition
2.3.4 is that goods with the same probability of being an attractor must be priced
symmetrically.
Proposition 2.3.4. Let q1 ≤ q2 ≤ · · · ≤ qK. Suppose p = (p1, p2, .., pK) maximizes
Πp; then it must be that p1 ≥ p2 ≥ .. ≥ pK ≥ 0. Moreover, if pj > 0 and qj 6= qj+1 it
must be that pj > pj+1 (Price Decreasing in q), and whenever qi = qj for some i, j,
it must be that pi = pj, and if (Symmetry Within Groups).
Proof. See Appendix A.3.
In now analyze two particular cases and provide some numerical solutions. I first
illustrate the “symmetric” case in which all goods have the same probability of being
an attractor; using symmetry, I explicitly solve for the optimal price as a function
of the number of products K. I then consider the more general case of two sets of
goods, and numerically solve some examples.
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The Symmetric Case
Assume that for all j, qj = 1/K. The profit function for the monopolist simplifies
to
Π(p) =
1
K
K∑
j=1
(1− pj)
(
pj +
∑
l 6=j
pl(1− pl)
)
.
Consider the first order conditions:
∂Π(p)
∂pj
=
1
K
·
(
(1− 2pj)
(
1 +
∑
l 6=j
(1− pl)
)−∑
l 6=j
pl(1− pl)
)
= 0 for j = 1, ..., K.
Assuming symmetry, we can solve for the optimal price p∗ as a function of K:
p∗ =
2K − 1−√(2K − 1)2 − 3K(K − 1)
3(K − 1)
By proposition 2.3.4 (Symmetry Within Groups), p∗ is a global maximizer since it is
the unique symmetric solution to the set of first order conditions.
The relevant result here is that as K gets larger the monopolist will charge lower
prices6 (see Figure 2.1). While in a standard setup the monopolist would charge
monopoly price for all products, our behavioral setup introduces a market size ex-
ternality on prices. An increase (decrease) in the price of commodity j, besides the
direct effect on the market for product j, will decrease (increase) the market size for
all the other products.
A surprising result is that, a K gets large, the limK→∞ p∗ = 1/3. The intuition
behind this is that, at optimum, the marginal benefit (cost) in the market for j
of increasing (lowering) pj, must equal to the marginal cost (benefit) caused in the
market for the other goods. More formally, if we move pj away from p
∗, keeping
all other prices fixed at p∗, as K gets large, the marginal effect in the market for j
6In fact ∂p∗/∂K < 0
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Figure 2.1: The Symmetric Case: Profit Maximizing Price as a Function of the
Number of Goods
will be equal to 2/3(1 − 2pj), while that on the market for other goods is equal to
p∗(1− p∗) = 2/9; for the two effects to be equal we need pj = 1/3. Alternatively you
can consider the limit as K gets large of the profit function restricted to symmetric
prices; we have that
lim
K→∞
ΠK = (1− p)2p,
which indeed attains a maximum at p = 1/3.
Two Sets of Goods
Consider now the more general case where qi 6= qj for some i, j. As no general
closed form solution exists even in the two goods case, I explore a specific setup
to offer some qualitative insights on the pattern of optimal prices as the number of
products and the relative probabilities change.
Assume there are two sets of goods, K1 and K2, such that for all i ∈ {1, .., k1},
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qi = q1, and for all j ∈ {k1 + 1, .., K}, qj = q2; also, k2 = K−k1, and 0 < k1 < K. By
proposition 2.3.4 (symmetry within groups) we know that if p is maximizes Π, then
all goods in one group must have the same price. I consider two simple cases.
Only Two Goods Suppose K1 = K2 = 1. The FOCs in this case are equal to:
(1− 2pj)
(
qj + qi(1− pi)
)− qjpi(1− pi) = 0 for i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j.
By concavity of Π(p1, p2) (proposition 2.3.3), the unique solution to the FOCs p
∗ =
(p∗1, p
∗
2) is a global maximum. I numerically solve the maximization problem for
different values of q and plot the results in Figure The black (blu) line represents p∗1
(p∗2) as a function of q1 (q2); note that p
∗
1 = 1/2 when q1 = 0, as we already know
by proposition 2.3.1, and decreases smoothly to 0.375 when q = 1. The two lines
intersect when q1 = q2 = 1/2 at p = 0.422. 2.2.
                                    
 
 
q2=1
p1 p2
.35
.375
.422 .422
.35
.375
.50.50
0 0
1/2 q1=1
Figure 2.2: Profit Maximizing Prices with Two Goods as a function of q1 and q2
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Few Attractors, Many Goods Consider now the special case in which K1 ·q1 = 1,
that is, only one subset of goods K1 can be attractors with probability q1 = 1/K1.
By proposition 3.2 we know that for all other goods the price will be set to 1/2. I
consider the optimal price p1 as a function of both K1 and K2.
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Figure 2.3: Few Attractors, Many Goods: the optimal price p1 as a function of K2
Let’s start considering the case were K1 = 1; in this case q1 = 1, and given that
all other prices will be set equal to 1/2, we can express the profit for the monopolist
as a function of p1 only:
Πˆ(p1) = (1− p1)
(
p1 +
K2
4
)
.
It is easy to verify that
p∗1 =

4−K2
8
for K2 ≤ 4
0 for K2 > 4
.
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In words price decreases from 1/2 to 0 in steps of 1/8 by adding one product at the
time.
Now let K1 vary; again, we know that all goods in the second set will have a price
equal to 1/2. So consider the monopolist’s profit:
Πˆ(p1) = (1− p1)
(
p1 + (K1 − 1)p1(1− p1) + K2
4
)
.
It is easy to verify that
p∗1 =

(2K1−1)−
q
(2K1−1)2−3(k1−1)(k1−K24 )
3(K1−1) for K2 ≤ 4K1
0 for K2 > 4K1
.
In Figure 2.3 I plot the optimal price p1 as a function of K2 for K1 = 1, 2, ..., 10.
2.3.2 The Duopoly Case
Consider now competition between two stores selling K products, A and B, lo-
cated at the endpoints of a segment of length 1. As for the monopolist case, I assume
that the marginal cost of supplying the products is equal zero. I further assume that
a mass one of consumers is distributed uniformly along the segment, and consumers’
willingness to pay νij for good j ∈ {1, ..., K} is i.i.d. across both consumers and
goods. Consumers face linear travel costs of visiting a store; if we denote by xi the
distance of consumer i from store A, where xi ∼ U(0, 1), the cost of visiting store A
is thus equal to xi.
The setup of the game is very similar to the monopolist setup. In stage 0, nature
assigns to each consumer i a vector of valuations vi = (vi1, ..., viK), were vik ∼ U(0, 1)
for k = 1, .., K, and an attractor j ∈ {1, 2, ..., K} according to a distribution f(j) = qj.
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The distribution f(·) is known to the stores. In stage 1 the two stores simultaneously
set prices to maximize expected profits given f(·). In stage 2 consumers learn their
attractor j, their valuation for it vij, and its price pj and decide to visit a store A
whenever vij ≥ pAj + xi and pAj + xi ≥ pBj + 1 − xi. Alternatively they decide to
visit store B if vij ≥ pBj + (1− xi) and pBj + 1− xi ≥ pAj + xi, or decide not to visit
a store if vij ≤ min{pAj + xi , pBj + (1− xi)}. In stage 3 consumers, once in a store,
learn their valuations for the other products and purchase any product k for which
vik ≥ pSk.
Let pAj, pBj for j = 1, ..., K denote the prices charged by the two firms, and let
k1 ≤ K denote the (sub-)set of attractors (i.e. {j : qj > 0}). The profit function
of firm A is a weighted sum of revenues, over the distribution of attractors j, from
people who decide to visit the store. Note that both firms will never charge a price
greater than one for any of the products, as in this case demand would be zero.
Conversely, it is possible for prices to be negative, as pricing below marginal cost can
be supported in equilibrium when the higher revenues due to the increased traffic at
a store outweigh the loss deriving from such a low price. The profit of store A is thus
equal to
ΠA(pA, pB) =
k1∑
j=1
qj
(
pAj +
∑
l 6=j
pl(1−max{0, pl})
)
DAj(pAj, pBj), (2.7)
where DAj(pAj, pBj) denotes the fraction of consumers who’s attractor is j that decide
to fit store A, and (1−max{0, pl}) denotes the probability a consumer will buy good
l once in a store.
Denote dj the distance for which a consumer who’s attractor good is j would be
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indifferent between visiting the two stores, that is
dj = {x : pAj + x = pBj + (1− x)} = max
{
1− pAj + pBj
2
, 0
}
.
The probability that a consumer will visit store A will thus be positive if and only
if xi ≤ min{dj , 1 − pAj}. The fraction of consumers DAj that will visit store A is
therefore equal to:
DAj(pAj, pBj) =

∫ dj
0
Pr(νij ≥ pAj + x)dx if pAj ≤ 1− pBj and pAj ≤ 1 + pBj∫ 1−pAj
0
Pr(νij ≥ pAj + x)dx if 1 + pBj ≥ pAj ≥ 1− pBj
0 if pAj ≥ 1 + pBj
Propositions 2.3.5 and 2.3.6 further restrict prices to be smaller or equal to 1/2.
Proposition 2.3.5. A duopolist will set a price pSj = 1/2 whenever qj = 0 for some
j ∈ 1, ..., K
Proof. W.l.g. consider, pAj. Given qj = 0, for any (pA, pB)−j, pAj = 1/2 is the only
solution to the FOCs ∂ΠA/∂pAj = 0, where
∂ΠA
∂pAj
=

1 for pAj ≤ 0
(1− 2pAj)
∑
l 6=j qlDl(pAl, pBl) otherwise
Proposition 2.3.6. Assume 1 > qj > 0 for some j. A duopolist S will never charge
a price pSj ≥ 1/2 for any prices pSk, k 6= j and any prices offered by the competitor
pS′.
Proof. See Appendix A.4.
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The case of One Attractor
In the simplest version of the model the duopolists compete over consumers when
only one good is an attractor and k additional products are sold. Under these as-
sumptions the model is very similar to a Hoteling model with the complication that
consumers are heterogeneous in their willingness to pay.
Let pA, pB denote the price charged by the two stores for the attractor. By
proposition 2.3.5 we know that the k non attractors will be charged a price equal to
1/2, and by propositions 2.3.6 we know that pS ≤ 1/2 for S = A,B. Furthermore,
the following proposition holds:
Proposition 2.3.7. A set of prices (pA, pB) such that, either pA−pB > 1 or pB−pA >
1 will never support an equilibrium.
Proof. Suppose pA − pB > 1 (pB − pA > 1); then nobody is visiting store A (B) and
store B (A) can strictly increase profits by setting a higher price.
Under propositions 2.3.5-2.3.7 we can write the profit of firm A as be equal to:
ΠA(pA) = (pA + k/4)
∫ dˆ
0
Pr(νi ≥ pA + x)dx
=
1
8
(pA + k/4)(1− pA + pB)(3− 3pA − pB)
Now consider the FOCs of the problem for firm A:
∂ΠA(pA)
∂pA
= 9p2A− (12 + 4pB)pA + (−p2B + 2pB + 3) +K/4(6pA− 6− 2pB) = 0 (2.8)
The following proposition shows that there exist a unique symmetric equilibrium
pA = pB = p
∗, that is decreasing in k.
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Proposition 2.3.8. There exist a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium in which both
stores charge the same prices. Furthermore, the symmetric equilibrium price is de-
creasing in K and will be negative for k > 2.
Proof. ΠA(pA, pB) is a third order polynomial in pA. If we have an interior solution
the maximum of ΠA(·) corresponds to the smallest solution of the FOC, so that the
best response of store A is continuous in pB. Once we impose symmetry, a symmetric
equilibrium price is found at the smallest solution to the FOC
4p2 − (10 +K)p+ (3− 3K/2) = 0,
that is
p∗ =
(10−K)−√(10−K)2 − 16(3− 3/2K)
8
(2.9)
Furthermore, the largest solution is always found at p > 1, so that the symmetric
equilibrium is unique. If we totally differentiate the expression above, by the implicit
function theorem we have that
dp
dK
= − 3/2− p
10− 8p− k < 0,
as the numerator is positive by proposition 2.3.6, and, by (2.9) a) for K = 2, p∗ = 0
and b) for K 6= 2, p∗ < (10−K)/8 .
Figure 2.4 plots the symmetric equilibrium price as a function of k.
The case of Two Attractors
I now consider the more general case in which the two stores compete over con-
sumers with two attractor goods and sell k additional goods. By propositions 2.3.5
Profits of firm A are given by:
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Figure 2.4: The Duopoly Case with linear Travel Costs, 1 attractor and K non at-
tractors: symmetric equilibrium prices p∗ as a function of K
ΠA(pA, pB) =
∑
j=1,2
qj(pAj + pA−j(1−max{0, pAj})) + k/4)
∫ dj
0
Pr(νi ≥ pAj + x)dx
where j,−j = {1, 2} and dj = (1− pAj + pBj)/2. Suppose firms set prices such that
they attract a strictly positive mass of consumers for each of the two goods, then the
profit of firm A is equal to
ΠA =
q1
8
[
(pA1 + pA2(1−max{0, pA2}) + k/4
][
1− pA1 + pB1
][
3− 3pA1 − pB1
]
+
q2
8
[
(pA2 + pA1(1−max{0, pA1}) + k/4
][
1− pA2 + pB2
][
3− 3pA2 − pB2
]
For ease of notation, consider the case in which prices are non-negative (it is
straightforward to consider the case when prices are negative). Consider the set of
first order conditions for the two firms. A set of equilibrium prices at an interior
82
solution must satisfy the following set of four quadratic equations in four unknowns:
∂ΠS
∂pj
= qj
[
9p2Sj − (12 + 4pS′j)pSj + (−p2S′j + 2pS′j + 3) +(
6pSj − (6 + 2pS′j)
)(
pSl(1− pSl) +K/4
)]
+
ql(1− 2pSj)
[
3p2Sl − (6 + 2pS′l)pSl + (−p2S′l + 2pS′l + 3)
]
= 0
for S, S ′ = A,B and j, l = 1, 2.
I focus here on symmetric equilibria. As the profit function is a truncated third
order polynomial in pSj for S = A,B and j = 1, 2, the maximum at an interior
solution is found at the smallest solution of the quadratic first order conditions; for
a given value of (q1, q2) the symmetric equilibrium is therefore the unique solution to
the following set of two equations in the two unknowns p1, p2:
qj
[(
4p2j − 10pj + 3
)
+ (4pj − 6)
(
pk(1− pk) + k/4
)]
+ qk(1− 2pj)
[− 4pk + 3] = 0
for j = 1, 2. In figure 2.5 I plot the symmetric equilibrium prices when k = 0, 1, 2. The
plot was constructed by numerically solving the set of equations. As it appears clear
from the figure price is a decreasing function a good’s attractiveness, and negative
pricing can be supported in equilibrium. Conversely, given a distribution qj, for
j = 1, 2, the symmetric equilibrium prices are not always decreasing in K. The latter
however holds for the good with the highest probability of being an attractor.
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Figure 2.5: The Duopoly Case with linear Travel Costs, 2 Attractors and K Goods:
symmetric equilibrium prices p1 and p2 as a function of q1 and q2
2.4 Attractor Goods: Model Predictions and Em-
pirical Evidence
Retail stores typically sell a large number of products and frequently vary their
assortments and prices. Consumers are typically uncertain about prices at different
stores and for a consumer to consider the entire distribution of bundles and prices
might be a far too complex decision process. While it is plausible that consumers
rationally anticipate prices when planning a shopping trip, or otherwise form expec-
tations on the potential surplus from a shopping trip, consumers make their purchase
decision only once in a store and often end up buying substitute and complementary
products, or even additional products which were not used to formulate their store
choice. Attractor goods can so be interpreted as the set of goods the consumer is both
aware of and rationally plans to buy, and by introducing this form form of bounded
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rationality I can characterize the effect on prices of consumers tendency to buy more
than originally planned.
According to the model, the optimal pricing involves pricing goods lower and lower
the higher the probability of being an attractor. This result naturally follows from the
market size externality of setting a low price: the more attractive a good the larger
this externality. In particular, goods which are never attractors should be priced as in
a standard single-product monopoly case by equating a product’s marginal revenue
to marginal cost, while attractor goods should be priced taking into account also the
marginal revenue on the other goods, and might be priced below marginal cost when
the latter effect is large. The examples below suggest that the model’s predictions
are consistent with the empirical evidence.
Barsky, Bergen, Dutta, and Levy (2001) focus on marginal cost and the estimation
of markups; using the price gap between branded and private label products they
estimate markups on selected product categories in the groceries industry using data
from a major Chicago supermarket chain. In particular the build three measures
of markup: the full markup, the retailer markup on the national brand, and the
retailer markup on the private label. To the extent that national brands attract
more than private labels, and given that the national brand manufacturer does not
internalize the externality for the retailer, the attractor good hypothesis would imply
lower retail margins on national brands than on private labels. Conversely, we would
expect higher markups on products that do not fall in the main categories sold at
the store. Consistently with the model, Barsky et al. find that in all of the 19
categories analyzed markups are significantly higher on private labels than on national
brands. Furthermore, the highest markups are found in categories of products for
which consumers only seldomly anticipate a purchase.7
7The five categories with the highest markups are toothbrush, soft drinks, crackers, grooming
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A second inference that can originate from the model has to do with the cycli-
cality of demand for certain goods. Using the terminology of the paper, some goods
attractiveness peaks in different times of the year: a perfect example would be turkey
for thanksgiving. According to the model we expect very low prices and margins dur-
ing demand peaks in order to attract a larger pool of customers. Empirical evidence
points in this prediction as Chevalier, Kashyap, and Rossi (2003) showed in a recent
paper. The authors compare three theories of imperfect competition which can pro-
duce countercyclical prices; by examining retail and wholesale prices they show that
prices and margins for specific goods fall during demand peaks, even if these periods
do not coincide with aggregate demand peaks for the retailer; they suggest their find-
ings are consistent with loss leader models rather than cyclical demand elasticities or
cyclical firm conduct. The attractor good hypothesis generalizes model of loss leader
pricing in that low markups and loss leaders can arise even on the regular price of a
product and without extensive advertisement when a good’s probability of being an
attractor is high.
While the examples above are limited to the supermarket industry, the notion
of attractor goods should not be confined to, nor is most important in, the analysis
of supermarkets. It can provide a powerful explanation to a large amount of price
dispersion where the assumption of rationality fails, and to the extent that consumers
tend to purchase more than what they plan before visiting a store, the qualitative
predictions of the model should be observed in the pricing strategies of retailers.
products and analgesics.
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2.5 Conclusions
Retailers’ pricing decisions have to take into account not only the direct effect of
prices on a product’s demand but also the effect on the demand for the other products
sold in the store. A low price on some goods will attract more traffic into the store,
which turns into higher profits if the other goods are sold at higher margins. Pricing
strategies by retailers typically involve varying margins and markups across products
and over time and several models give different explanations to such differences. Loss
leader models, for example, show that it is sometimes convenient to advertise low
prices on some goods to attract uninformed consumers who, once in the store, and
because of transportation costs, will decide to shop also other goods on which retailers
set higher margins.
While numerous papers have explained many retail strategies within a rational
framework, their results often have limited scope in their application, and unease
with the assumption of consumer rationality has led many researchers to explore
alternative explanations. By giving up a fully rational consumer, using the notion of
attractor goods, I am able to characterize a very important aspect of retail pricing: a
goods price exerts a market size externality on the rest of the goods, and the relative
strength of such externality depends on the relative attractiveness of a good. If
stores take into account such externality in their pricing decisions markups will be a
decreasing function of the goods’ attractiveness. The model provides a generalization
to the strategy of loss leader pricing as low markups can arise even on the regular
price of a product and without extensive advertisement. Furthermore, the attractor
goods hypothesis offers an intuitive explanation to countercyclical markups that is
consistent with the empirical evidence.
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Appendix A
Appendices
A.1 Calculation of GMS tests and confidence in-
tervals for Moment Inequalities
Andrews and Soares (2010) introduced a generalized moment selection (GMS)
procedure which provides confidence sets (CS) that have correct asymptotic size in a
uniform sense and are not asymptotically conservative. For the inequalities models in
the present paper I adapt one of selection criteria suggested by the authors to the case
in which moments have a different number of observations, and introduce a way to
characterize a 1−α confidence interval by means of a grid search around the vertices
of the estimated set. I here describe how I proceed with the actual calculations; more
details on the GMS procedure can be found in Andrews and Soares (2010).
Consider the moment inequality model. The value of the true parameters θ0 ∈ Rd
satisfies the moment conditions:
EF0mj(yi, θ0) ≥ 0 for j = 1, ..., p (A.1)
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where {mj(·, θ) : j = 1, ..., p} are p known real-valued functions and {yi : i ≥ 1} are
i.i.d random vectors with distribution F0. Let Tn(θ) denote a test statistic for testing
H0 : θ = θ0; Andrews and Soares (2010) propose we construct CS by inversion of the
test, that is finding
CSn = {θ ∈ Θ : Tn(θ) ≤ c1−α(θ)} (A.2)
where c1−α(θ) is a critical value that depends on the value of θ.
The observed sample is a subset of {yi : i ≤ n}, where for each moments we have
observations ij = 1, ..., nj, nj ≤ n. Consider the empirical moment functions:
mj(y, θ) =
1
nj
Nj∑
i
mj(yi, θ) (A.3)
Denote mn(θ) = (m1(θ), ...,mp(θ))
′ and let Σ denote the asymptotic covariance of
n1/2mn(θ). The test statistic Tn(θ) is defined to be
Tn(θ) = S(n
1/2mn(θ), Σˆn(θ))
where S is one of the real functions suggested in Andrews and Soares (2010), and
Σˆn(θ) is a consistent estimator of Σ.
As in my setup moments have a different number of observations, I consistently
estimate Σ, the asymptotic covariance of n1/2mn(θ), by bootstrapping 1000 times the
means n
1/2
j mj(θ) for j = 1, ..., p. I then compute Tn using n
1/2mn = (n
1/2
1 m1, ..., n
1/2
p mp)
As a choice of S I consider S = S1 defined by
S1 =
p∑
j=1
(mj/σj)
2
−,
where σ2j is the j-th diagonal element of Σ.
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Now consider the asymptotic null distribution of Tn(θ). By central limit theory
this is given by
S(Ω
1/2
0 Z
∗ + h,Ω0)
where Z∗ ∼ Np(0, I), and the p-vector h ∈ Rp+∞ is the limit of n1/2EFn(m(yi, θ0)).
As h cannot be consistently estimated, Andrews and Soares (2010) propose using a
data-dependent version of S(Ω
1/2
0 Z
∗ + h,Ω0) that replaces h with with a vector φ(·)
that depends on the “slackness” of the moment inequalities. As a measure of the
degree of slackness for moment j, the authors suggest using
ξjn(θ) = κ
−1
nj
n
1/2
j σˆ
−1
j (θ)mj(θ),
for a divergent sequence of constants {κn : n ≥ 1}. The desired replacement for h
then will be zero when ξjn(θ) is zero or close to zero, it will +∞ when ξnj(θ) is large.
My choice for the constant is κn = (lnn)
1/2, and as a replacement for h is use
φj(ξ
j,Ω) =

0, if ξj ≤ 1
+∞, if ξj > 1
Given a choice of φ(ξ,Ω), the GMS critical value cn(θ0, 1−α) is the 1−α quantile
of
Ln(θ0, Z
∗) = S(Ωˆ1/2n (θ0)Z
∗ + φn(ξn(θ0)), Ωˆn(θ0)) (A.4)
where Z∗ ∼ Np(0, I). That is
cn(θ0, 1− α) = inf{x ∈ R : P (Ln(θ0, Z∗) < x) ≥ 1− α} (A.5)
Construction of CS by inverting the test can be very demanding computationally,
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if feasible at all; the search of points in the CS over the parameter space Θ involves
estimating Σ and constructing cn at any parameter value. Additionally, characteri-
zation of the CS can be very hard when the estimates are a set. For these reasons I
take a simple approach to characterize the CS around the vertices of the set estimate
by means of a grid search.
When the model is linear, the identified set is a d−dimensional polytope, and
minima and maxima for each of the parameters are found at (some of) the vertices
of the set. Minima (and maxima) are readily found by solving one dimension at the
time the linear programming problem
min θl (max θl) subject to mn(y, θ) ≥ 0
Let θ = (θl, θ−l), and denote θˆ one of the bounds solving the linear programming
problem. To characterize the CS I proceed as follows:
1. Estimate Σˆθˆ = Σˆ(θˆ)
2. For dimensions l = 1, ..., d, for an increasing sequence δn, let
θˆn =

(θˆl − δn, θˆ−l) if θˆ is a lower bound
(θˆl + δn, θˆ−l) if θˆ is an upper bound
3. Start from n = 1; construct Tn(θˆn) and cn(θˆn). Continue while Tn < cn.
4. Repeat 1-3 at all vertices of the identified set.
Table 13 provides an example for the set estimates of inequality model (2). The
upper-left block of the table reports the highest and lowest values for each of the
parameters as well as a 95% confidence bounds moving away from the vertex. The
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other blocks report the value of the other parameters at the specific vertices, as well as
a 95% confidence bounds moving away from the vertex along each of the parameters’
dimension.
92
Table A.1: Characterizing CS for set estimates using GMS
Vertex All γ0 ξB ξC
of serch lb. ub. lb. ub. lb. ub. lb. ub.
γ0 -1.85 –1.75 -1.85 –1.75 -1.85 -1.85 -1.85 -1.74
-1.87 -1.74 -1.87 -1.74 -1.87 -1.84 -1.87 -1.74
ξA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
ξB -25.56 –8.60 -16.57 -16.32 -25.56 –8.60 -18.86 -16.51
-25.64 -8.52 -19.91 -12.63 -25.64 -8.52 -21.81 -12.75
ξC -13.70 –13.08 -13.70 -13.08 -13.68 -13.64 -13.70 –13.08
-13.73 -13.04 -13.74 -13.04 -13.75 -13.59 -13.73 -13.04
ξD -7.39 7.06 1.29 0.66 -5.56 6.38 -0.92 0.51
-7.44 7.11 1.24 0.72 -5.62 6.42 -0.96 0.56
ξE -9.80 4.64 -1.13 -1.49 -7.98 3.96 -3.34 -1.67
-9.86 4.69 -1.19 -1.45 -8.03 4.01 -3.38 -1.59
ξF -29.07 –19.27 -23.35 -22.82 -29.07 -19.70 -25.26 -22.95
-29.24 -19.14 -25.59 -20.07 -29.21 -19.59 -27.76 -20.20
ξG -34.35 –13.87 -22.22 -22.10 -30.22 -17.23 -25.04 -22.36
-34.53 -13.72 -28.00 -17.89 -34.53 -13.76 -30.30 -18.08
Vertax ξD ξE ξF ξG
of search lb. ub. lb. ub. lb. ub. lb. ub.
γ0 -1.85 -1.85 -1.85 -1.85 -1.85 -1.74 -1.85 -1.85
-1.87 -1.84 -1.87 -1.84 -1.87 -1.74 -1.87 -1.84
ξA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
ξB -23.56 -12.66 -23.61 -12.56 -22.33 -13.09 -23.92 -12.32
-25.63 -8.50 -25.63 -8.51 -25.65 -9.15 -24.68 -9.49
ξC -13.70 -13.63 -13.69 -13.67 -13.66 -13.08 -13.70 -13.65
-13.75 -13.59 -13.74 -13.59 -13.75 -13.04 -13.73 -13.58
ξD -7.39 -7.06 -7.39 7.06 -4.55 4.13 -4.67 4.51
-7.44 7.11 -7.44 7.11 -4.61 4.19 -4.72 4.56
ξE -9.80 -4.64 -9.80 -4.64 -6.97 1.96 -7.09 2.09
-9.87 4.68 -9.86 4.69 -7.02 2.02 -7.15 2.14
ξF -29.07 -19.70 -29.07 -19.70 -29.07 –19.27 -28.13 -20.68
-29.28 -19.58 -29.21 -19.58 -29.24 -19.14 -29.22 -19.58
ξG -29.04 -19.86 -29.20 -19.66 -28.28 -19.68 -34.35 –13.87
-34.58 -13.92 -34.55 -13.82 -33.77 -14.66 -34.53 -13.72
Avg. n 142,873
Notes: Characterization of the Confidence Set (CS) for the set estimates from the inequality
model. I use the GMS procedure and perform a grid search around the vertices of the set estimate.
γ0 denotes disutility from driving time and ξs denote store fixed effects. α, disutility from
expenditure is normalized to -1. The upper-left block of the table reports the highest and lowest
values as well as a 95% confidence bounds moving away from the vertex of the identified set
where they are located. The other blocks of table (5) report the value of the other parameters
at the specific vertices, as well as a 95% confidence bounds moving away from the vertex along
each of the parameters’ dimension.
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A.2 Price Indices
In the present paper price indices are used in the determination of expenditure on a
bundle at an alternative store. As expenditure on the specific bundle affects the utility
of a consumer on top and beyond the “price level” at a store, key in the construction
of indices is to capture the consumer’s expected difference in expenditure for each
specific bundle. In general households are extremely different both in the category
expenditure mix and in the within category product mix, and the construction of
trip and household specific price indices seems most appropriate. The adequacy of
one particular index ultimately depends on the nature of the stores in the market,
whether they are close substitutes, whether they carry the same or entirely different
sets of product, and the degree of price variation across stores and over time.
In the market I analyze supermarkets are fairly homogeneous, and products ac-
counting for over 95% of expenditure are sold in more than one chain. I observe both
aggregate and consumer level data on purchases in 31 packaged goods categories for
the years 2001-2007. In my main model specifications I use category level price in-
dices using aggregate data on sales. I consider aggregation both at a weekly level
and at a larger period of aggregation; as my aim is to capture expected difference in
expenditure I use periods of 5 weeks (for a total of 73 periods in 365 weeks). The
use of a larger time span is convenient in that it smooths out the effect of temporary
promotional sales; this is important because a weekly index would make the store
offering a promotional sale relatively cheaper than another, even when the consumers
expect it to be more expensive. Additionally, as not all items available in a store are
sold in a given week, a larger time period increases significantly the number of items
effectively observed.
I construct category price indices as a weighted average of log-deviations of items’
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prices at the store from a reference average price. To avoid that an average price is
influenced by own price at the store, I construct average prices using national data
from the 50 markets. For each store, I construct category indices including 1) all items
sold at the store, 2) only items that are sold in more than one store and 3) only items
that are sold in more than one chain. Although conceptually very different, the three
indices are very similar in their values. When I construct alternative expenditures
on trip bundles using the three indices, not only is the relative ranking of stores in
terms of price the same for almost all of the trips, but also the resulting difference in
expenditure is very close. This should not come to a surprise, as products available
in more than one chain cover over 95% of expenditure.
The actual construction of the indices is as follows. Consider all the products i
sold in category j at time t in the market, and construct market expenditure weights
wijt. For all items i construct average price pijt; similarly, if the item is sold at time
t in supermarket s, construct average price at store s, psijt. Let sj denote the set of
products sold at time t at store s. The price index for catagory j in time t at store s
is given by
psjt =
∑
i 1(i ∈ sj)wijt(1 + log(psijt/pijt))∑
i 1(i ∈ sj)wijt
I further construct an overall index pst for the price level at the store as a category-
expenditure weighted average of category price indices, that is
pst =
∑
j
wjtpsjt,
where wjt are market expenditure weights for category j. As I do not observe products
and prices in for the residual category, I use the overall price level at the store pst.
Consider a trip (h, s, b, t) and let ej(b, pst) denote the observed expenditure in category
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j for bindle b; for all alternative stores s′ 6= s I construct expenditure ebs′t as
e˜bs′t =
∑
j
ej(b, pst)
(
pjs′t/pjst
)
.
Results are presented using 5-week indices based only on items that are sold in more
than one chain.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 2.3.4
By Proposition 2.3.2, pj = 1/2 whenever qj = 0. Let i = min
j
{j : qj > 0}; by
Proposition 2.3.1 pi < 1/2. Let j ≥ i.
• Suppose pj > 0; then it must be the case that
∂Π(p)
∂pj
= 0 and
∂Π(p)
∂pj+1
≤ 0 (A.6)
Let qj+1 = qj + ∆q, and pj+1 = pj + ∆p; substitute qj+1 and pj+1 in (3). We
get:
∂Π(p)
∂pj+1
= C1 − 2∆p
(
qj(2− pj) + ∆q + C2
)
+ ∆q
(
1− 2pj + C3 − pj(1− pj)
)
∂Π(p)
∂pj
= C1 + ∆p
(
−2qj(1−2pj) + qjpj
)
+ (∆p)2qj + ∆q
(
1−pj−∆p
)
(1−2pj)
where C2 and C3 are positive functions of prices independent from pj, pj+1, qj
and qj+1.
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We need to show that ∆p ≤ 0.
– Suppose ∆q > 0; for (A.6) to hold we have that
∂Π(p)
∂pj+1
− ∂Π(p)
∂pj
≤ 0 (A.7)
Rearranging terms we get
∂Π(p)
∂pj+1
− ∂Π(p)
∂pj
= (∆p)2 qj︸︷︷︸
>0
+∆p∆q (3− 2pj)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
+∆q (p2j + C3)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
+∆p (2C2 + 2qj(1 + pj))︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
≤ 0;
therefore ∆p < 0.
– Suppose instead ∆q = 0. Let p′ = (p1, ..., pj−1, 0, 0, pj+2, ...); since qj =
qj+1 and ∂Π(p)/∂pj and ∂Π(p)/∂pj+1 are decreasing in all prices, and the
optimal pj is positive, it must be the case that
∂Π(p)
∂pj+1
∣∣∣∣
p′
> 0,
and therefore, ∂Π(p)/∂pj+1 must equal zero at optimum. But then equa-
tion (A.7) must hold with equality, and since ∆q = 0 it reduces to
∂Π(p)
∂pj+1
− ∂Π(p)
∂pj
= (∆p)2 qj︸︷︷︸
>0
+∆p (2C2 + 2qj(1 + pj))︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
= 0;
so pj = pj+1.
• Suppose pj = 0; it must be that
∂Π(p)
∂pj
=
(
qj + qj+1(1− pj+1) + C2)
)− qjpj+1(1− pj+1)− qjC3 ≤ 0,
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where C2 and C3 are defined as before. Now consider the FOC for pj+1:
∂Π(p)
∂pj+1
= (1− 2pj)
(
qj + qj+1 + C2)
)− qj+1C3
=
∂Π(p)
∂pj
− qj(pj+1 + p2j+1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
−∆qC3︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
− pj+1(qj+1 + 2C2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
≤ ∂Π(p)
∂pj
.
If either ∆q > 0 or pj+1 > 0 the disequality will be strict,, hence pj+1 = 0.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 2.3.6
W.l.g. consider the case of firm A. Suppose for some qj > 0, pAj ≥ 1/2. The
proposition holds if ∂ΠA/∂pAj ≤ 0 for all pAj ≥ 1/2 and all pBj.
• Suppose pAj > 1− pBj. Then
∂ΠA
∂pAj
= qj
∂
∂pAj
(
pAjDj
)
+ (1− 2pAj)
∑
l 6=j
qlDl
≤ qj
(
3p2Aj − 4pAj + 1) ≤ 0
• Suppose instead pAj ≤ 1− pBj. Then pBj ≤ 1/2
– If pAj ≥ 1/2 and pBj ≥ −1/2
∂ΠA
∂pAj
= qj
∂
∂pAj
(
pAjDj
)
+ (1− 2pAj)
∑
l 6=j
qlDl
≤ 9p2Aj − 12pAj − 4pAjpBj + 3 + 2pBj − p2Bj
≤ 0
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– If pAj ≥ 1/2 and pBj ≤ −1/2
∂ΠA
∂pAj
= (1− 2pAj)
∑
l 6=j
qlDl < 0.
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